American strategic policy and Iranian political development 1943-1979 by Shabdar, Mohsen
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1985 
American strategic policy and Iranian political development 
1943-1979 
Mohsen Shabdar 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Shabdar, Mohsen, "American strategic policy and Iranian political development 1943-1979" (1985). 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5189. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5189 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
Th is  is  an unpublished  manuscript  in  which  copyright  sub­
s i s t s , Any further r e p r in t in g  of it s  contents must be approved
BY THE AUTHOR,
Ma n s f ie l d  L ibrary  
Un iv e r s it y  of Montana 
Date : •*' 1 8

AMERICAN STRATEGIC POLICY 
AND
IRANIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
1943-1979
By
Mohsen Shabdar 
B.A., Rocky Mountain College, 1983 
Presented in p a r t ia l  fu l f i l lm e n t  of the requirements fo r  the degree o f
Master o f Arts 
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 
1985
Approved by: ‘
Chairman, Board o f Examir\efs
Dean, Graduate School
UMI Number: EP40653
All rights reserved
INFORM ATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI EP40653
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Dlassertsitan P hi h-ng
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346
Shabdar, Mohsen, M.A., February 1985 P o lit ic a l Science
American Strateqic Policy and Iranian P o l i t ic a l  Development 1943- 
1979 (118 pp.)
D irector: Louis Hayes
The B r it is h  withdrawal from the Middle East a f te r  World War I I  
and the communist expansion in the area made the United States 
adopt a new s tra teg ic  po licy. The purpose o f th is  study is  to 
explain why Iran became important in American s tra teg ic  po licy and 
how th is  policy affected Iranian p o l i t ic a l  development. The scope 
of th is  thesis is centered upon the importance of Iran and the 
Shah's regime in American stra teg ic  policy throughout the Persian 
Gulf region. The study is focused on the s h if ts  in American 
stra teg ic policy which had both posit ive  and negative impacts on 
the Iranian government in the period between 1943-1979.
In 1941, Anglo-Russian forces invaded Iran and s p l i t  the country 
in to two spheres o f influence. I t  was during the war that the 
United States was attracted to that country. The f i r s t  s h i f t  in 
American s tra teg ic  po licy occurred when the United States recog­
nized the importance of Iran 's  location in the Persian Gulf and 
her natural resources. Before tha t, American foreign policy was 
based on tra d it io n a l non-involvemeht po licy . The American 
government seriously thought about a way to help Iran. During the 
war America stayed neutral in Iran because of i t s  a lliance with 
the Soviets and the B r it is h .  During th is  period, America helped 
Iran economically. Also, United States diplomacy was c r i t ic a l  in 
helping Iran regain i t s  independence.
During the second s h i f t ,  the American involvement in Iran became 
clearer and America supported Iran openly. The strength of 
American-Iranian re la tions reached a peak during th is  period. 
Because of the Cold War and the Soviet-American struggle over the 
Third World, the United States not only continued i t s  economic 
support o f Iran, but also started modernizing the Iranian armed 
forces. In th is  s h i f t ,  the Shah established his absolute power in 
Iran. He enjoyed to ta l American support fo r  his regime.
The th ird  s h i f t  occurred when President Carter introduced his 
human-rights po licy. This po licy , along with factionalism and 
disorganization w ith in  the Carter administration, had a big impact 
on the pre-revolutionary p o l i t ic a l  development in Iran.
American stra teg ic po licy served the Shah's own ambitions. The 
sh if ts  in th is  po licy , along with the Shah's way of ru ling , created 
an atmosphere o f anti-Shah fee ling. A combination of in ternal and 
external factors caused the Shah's downfall. The Iranian example 
o ffers a good lesson fo r  the future American foreign policy in the 
Middle East.
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I .  INTRODUCTION
Iran 's s tra teg ic  importance, enhanced during World War I I  by i t s  
increasing significance as a major source o f world o i l ,  has stimulated 
the superpowers (B r ita in  and the Soviet Union), to seek domination over 
the country in order to strengthen th e ir  security as well as th e ir  
p o l i t ic a l  and economic in terests  in the context o f changing world 
p o l i t ic s .  The race to control the Middle East pushed the superpowers 
in to a serious confrontation. In the late 1940's the growing Soviet 
expansionism and the l iq u id a t io n  o f B r i t is h  positions throughout the 
Middle East forced the United States to f i l l  the vacuum and to formulate 
policy fo r  the en tire  area. America's response to the Soviet expansion 
was the Truman Doctrine o f March, 1946. This doctrine was acclaimed by 
the Iranians as a fu r th e r  demonstration of the American in te res t in 
th e ir  security . The purpose of th is  paper is  to describe the nature and 
objectives of American s tra teg ic  po licy, and the assumptions upon which 
they have been based a f te r  World War I I .  This po licy has sh ifted  three 
times. These s h if ts  have had great impact on Iranian p o l i t ic a l  develop­
ment between the period of 1943-1979.
Before the f i r s t  s h i f t ,  American foreign policy was based on a 
tra d it io n a l non-involvement po licy . By the emergence of World War I I  
and the a lliance with B r ita in  and the Soviet Union, the United States 
became involved in  the war. This involvement signaled a change in 
American foreign po licy. A fte r  the war, hos tile  Soviet behavior in 
Europe became yet another reason fo r  the gradual s h i f t  in American 
po licy and public opinion.
1
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The f i r s t  s h i f t  occurred during World War I I  when Anglo-Russian 
forces jo in t l y  invaded and occupied Iran, exiled the Shah, and ins ta l le d  
his son, Mohammed Reza Shah as Monarch. The United States was neutral 
during the invasion. This n e u tra l i ty  changed to a supportive policy 
when the young Shah managed to  gain President Roosevelt's support fo r  
the guarantee of Iranian t e r r i t o r ia l  in te g r i ty  and p o l i t ic a l  independence.
Because of the wartime a ll iance , President Roosevelt wanted to keep 
America's cooperation with the a l l ie s ,  and at the same time, to support 
Iran 's  t e r r i t o r ia l  in te g r i ty .  For tha t reason, the president, during 
the Tehran Conference, asked the a l l ie s  fo r  Iran 's independence. 
Roosevelt's request resulted in the Tehran Declaration. In that 
declaration the three great powers promised to preserve Iran 's unity 
and independence.
The second s h i f t  in the American s tra teg ic  po licy occurred when the 
United States Government openly supported the Shah and his government.
The reason fo r  th is  new s h i f t  in American policy was because o f the o i l ,  
Iran 's  s tra teg ic  location in  the Persian Gulf, and the Cold War. The 
1940*s are known as the beginning of the Cold War era. Because of the 
continued communist threat throughout the Third World, the United States 
adopted the Point Four Plan. I t  was a term applied to technical cooper­
ation programs of the United States which assisted the Third World from 
1950 throughout 1965. The plan put special emphasis on Iran.
American technical cooperation helped the Iranian economy,. This 
second s h i f t  o f American s tra teg ic  po licy also concentrated on the 
Iranian armed forces. The Americans may have concluded that the Iranian 
m i l i ta ry ,  properly armed, tra ined , and indoctrinated, could act as a
3
s ta b i l iz in g  force with or without the Monarchy. Thus, America started 
i ts  biggest arms sale in Iran 's  h is to ry. There were many reasons fo r  
the arms sale, including f inanc ia l gain and the desire to keep Gulf 
nations out o f communist hands.
The nationa liza tion  o f the Iranian o i l  industry , and the emergence 
of Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq to power in Iran (1951-1953), stopped the 
American impact fo r  a while. The nationa liza tion was a real threat to 
the Anglo-American o i l  companies throughout the Persian Gulf. The 
United States feared tha t Iran, with i t s  huge o i l  reserves, might f a l l  
in to  Communist hands. Also, because o f Mossadeq's i n f l e x ib i l i t y ,  and 
Communist penetration throughout Iran, the U.S. Government supported 
Mossadeq's opponents. These opponents were compounded from the Shah, 
m i l i ta ry  o ff ice rs  and the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). These 
opponents succeeded, f in a l l y ,  in 1953 to overthrow Mossadeq.
The f in a l  s h i f t  in American s tra teg ic  po licy occurred during the 
Carter Administration. President Carter adopted the human r ig h ts 'p o l ic y . 
He attempted to reduce the level o f m i l i ta ry  assistance to Iran, while 
simultaneously increasing appropriations in the area of economic and 
humanitarian assistance. This po licy, along with the c o n f l ic t  w ith in  
the Carter Administration i t s e l f  (about the Iranian C r is is ) ,  had a great 
impact on the p o l i t ic a l  development in Iran.
The scope of th is  thesis centers upon American Strategic Policy and 
i t s  impact upon Iranian p o l i t ic s  (1943-1979), The f i r s t  and second 
sh if ts  had a positive impact on the s o l id i f ic a t io n  and s ta b i l iza t io n  of 
Iranian government, while in contrast, the th ird  had a negative impact.
4
The research w i l l  be on two levels. F irs t ,  the research w i l l  
consider b r ie f ly  the h is tory  of Iran 's  importance in American s tra teg ic  
po licy . Second, the research w i l l  focus s p e c if ic a l ly  on the impact of 
American stra teg ic  po licy on Iranian domestic p o l i t ic s .
The information which has been used in  th is  research was generated 
from both primary and secondary sources, such as U.S. government documents, 
books, the academic journa ls , and the author's personal experience.
I I .  THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN SITUATION 
BEFORE AND DURING WORLD WAR I I
Persia (or Iran) w ith i t s  twenty-five hundred year h is to ry , had a 
great impact in the development o f the h is tory  of c iv i l iz a t io n .  Iran 
had produced a great and innovative c iv i l iz a t io n  that dared to dream of 
conquering a l l  the known world. I t  had defeated the dreaded Assyrians, 
b u i l t  one o f the strongest empires, and had come close to conquering 
Greece. By contrast, th is  empire, in the Twentieth Century, was weak 
and unable to protect even i t s  own te r r i t o r ia l  in te g r i ty .  Because of 
the Anglo-Russian im p e r ia l is t ic  aggression in Iran, the country barely 
seemed able to survive as an independent n a t ion .1
From the beginning of his emergence to power in Iran, Reza Shah
liked neither the B r it ish  nor the Russians. Yet, he cooperated with
the B r i t is h  to solve some o f the socio-economic problems which were 
facing Iran. Reza Shah ruled Iran u n t i l  1.941, and produced a strong 
d ic ta to r ia l  reform ist regime tha t strengthened the in ternal p o l i t ic s  of 
Iran against Anglo-Soviet r iv a l ry .  His main goal was to reduce Iran 's
dependence on B r ita in  and the Soviet Union, and hence, insulate i t  from
9
th e ir  r iv a l ry .  To reach his goal, Reza Shah was looking fo r  new 
friends in the western world to depend on. In the la te 1930's Reza Shah 
approached the United States and then Germany fo r  assistance.
In his search fo r  closer t ies  w ith a th ird  power, Reza Shah 
preferred the United States. The reason fo r  his choice was that he 
thought America was a geographically d is tant and la rge ly  a non-colonial 
power, presumably less ready than others to intervene in Iranian a f fa irs .  
Reza Shah wanted Persia to take i t s  r ig h t fu l  place in the g l i t te r in g  new
5
century of in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n ,  science, national pride, and, o f course,
he wanted to  create a strong monarchial system fo r  his son. He assumed
that America, with i t s  growing power and yet no national in te res t in
Persia's resources, might come to some specia l, benefic ia l role in
3rescuing Persia from i t s  humilia ting servitude.
Reza Shah thought tha t the best way to "reach" a u n if ica t ion  with
the Americans was by involv ing American o i l  companies in Iranian o i l
industry. Tehran arranged a v i s i t  fo r  a representative of the Standard
Oil Company in December 1937. This attempt fa i le d  because the State
4Department disassociated the U.S. Government from the mission. The 
reasons fo r  the State Department's reaction were the United States' 
b e l ie f  in a policy o f "low-key" involvement in the world a f fa irs  at that 
time and the recognition tha t the p a rt icu la r  region in the world was 
t ra d i t io n a l ly  a B r i t is h  sphere of influence.
A fte r  Iran 's  early  request fo r  American assistance fa i le d ,  Reza 
Shah turned to the Germans fo r  help. The r ise  o f Germany as a nation­
a l is t  and a n t i -B r i t is h  power had impressed Reza Shah, as i t  had many 
other n a t io n a lis t  governments and movements in Asia and the Middle East. 
Reza Shah hated the B r it is h  influence, and the B r i t is h  were unpopular 
with Iranian n a t iona lis ts . This h o s t i l i t y ,  combined with a German drive 
fo r  economic and p o l i t ic a l  influence in Iran, led to the development of 
German-Iranian friendship in the 1930s. In return fo r  strengthening 
th e i r  re la tionsh ip  with Iran, Nazi ideology declared Iran as a pure 
Aryan country. They bestowed on the Persians, the honor o f Aryan status 
and expanded trade between the two nations.^ By the la te 1930s, more 
than s ix  hundred German experts had been employed in various in d u s tr ia l ,
commercial, and educational projects in Iran. Trade developed rap id ly ,
and "by 1938 Germany accounted fo r  41 percent o f the to ta l foreign trade
8of Iran ."  German firms had a large ro le in the Trans-Iranian Railroad. 
The Germans opened sea and a i r  communication with Iran and provided most 
of the machinery and contractors in Iran 's in d u s tr ia l ,  mining and 
build ing program. Berlin also flooded Iran with agents and propaganda.
The real reason fo r  th is  "generous" German assistance to Iran was 
not because o f  Iran 's  Aryan status. I t  was because Germany saw Iran as 
a good base against the Soviet Union, a way to weaken the B r it is h  
position throughout the Middle East, and a vast supply o f o i l  and other 
natural resources.
On the eve o f World War I I ,  Iran housed German economic and p o l i t ­
ica l agents because the Iranian government had economic and p o l i t ic a l  
commitments ty ing i t  to a pro-German po licy . B r ita in  and the Soviet 
Union were alarmed and saw the Iranian-German friendship as a threat to 
th e i r  in terests throughout the region. These two tra d it io n a l r iv a ls ,  
B r ita in  and the Soviet Union, entered a wartime a lliance against Germany. 
They were looking fo r  a new way to aid Russians who were under heavy 
pressure from the advancing German forces. Thus, they chose Iran fo r  
tha t purpose, by requesting Reza Shah to use Iran as a bridge to trans­
port the American supplies to Russia.. He rejected the Anglo-Russian 
re q u e s t.^  The Shah declared Iran 's  n e u tra l i ty  in the War, This 
Iranian action made the a l l ie s  waste no more time; they invaded Iran.
In September, 1941, the Anglo-Russian forces invaded Iran from the 
south and the n o r th .^  Iran was divided in to  three zones by the B r it ish  
and Russians. Soviet troops were in the north and B r i t is h  troops in the
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south, while Tehran and other important areas were p rov is iona lly  placed
under jo in t  protection o f the two powers. The occupying forces also
exiled the Shah, and in s ta l le d  his son, Mohammed Reza, as Monarch. In
January, 1942, Great B r i ta in ,  Iran, and the Soviet Union signed an
Alliance. The A l l ie s  guaranteed to help "safeguard" Iran 's  economy from
negative e ffects  o f the war and to withdraw th e ir  troops from Iran w ith in
12a six-month time period.
The Anglo-Russian invasion brought d isaster to Iran. In f la t io n ,
famine, deteriora tion of the modern sector, and disruption of government
finance were a d irec t resu lt of the occupation. Iran was humiliated.
I t  lo s t  i t s  sovereignty. The conduct o f i t s  domestic and foreign a f fa irs
was d ire c t ly  subjected to the dictates o f the occupying forces. Iran
sank in to  growing social disorder, p o l i t ic a l  disarray, and economic
hardship. Many social and p o l i t ic a l  groups, including t r ib e s ,  appeared
in the Iranian p o l i t ic a l  scene with demands fo r  domestic reforms and
t r ib a l  autonomy. Some followed the B r i t is h  and some the Soviets. The
Anglo-Russian powers in Iran, on the other hand, were using th e ir  favored
13social and p o l i t ic a l  groups and tr ibes  against each other,
An important development tha t occurred because of the a l l ie s '  
occupation in Iran was the formation of the n a t io n a l is t  movement. This 
movement developed rap id ly  and was supported by those Iranians who were 
anxious because o f the chaotic domestic s itua t ion  as well as the 
humilia tion and in s ta b i l i t y  tha t Iran had suffered at the hands o f 
foreign powers. There was also an increase in urbanization. Competing 
groups and ideologies - -  n a t io n a l is t ,  re l ig io u s , and s o c ia l is t  — vied 
fo r  the allegiance o f Iranians as never b e fo re ,^
The Soviets signed an agreement with Great B r ita in  and Iran.
According to tha t agreement, the Soviets promised to  withdraw from Iran.
A fte r  the War ended, the Soviets had no in tention whatsoever o f leaving
Iran. The Soviets now found the opportunity to solve th e i r  Iranian
problem once and fo r  a l l ;  they began the "Sovie tiza tion" of northern"* I ran.
The Russians closed th e ir  zone o f occupation to free entry and put i t
under severe re s tr ic t io n s .  To enter the Soviet Zone there was a need
15fo r  special passes from the Soviet Embassy in  Tehran.
In the meantime, the Soviets revived and strengthened Iran 's 
Communist Party. In his campaign against a l l  organized opposition,
Reza Shah had banned the Communist Party in 1937. But under Soviet
pressure in  1941, f i f t y - tw o  leading members o f the party were released 
from prison, and soon a f te r ,  reorganized the party and renamed i t
I fi
Tudeh (the mass), with i t s  base in the Soviet Zone.
The Tudeh Party was a major c r i t i c  of the Tehran government, They 
opposed the in s t i tu t io n  of Monarchy, and the B r it is h  presence and in te r ­
ference in Iran. I t  advocated s o c ia l is t  reform and autonomy fo r  the 
provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, with which the Soviets shared a 
common geographical, ethnic, and re lig ious  background. Eventually, the 
Tudeh and the Kurds succeeded in establishing two autonomous regimes in 
Azerbarijan and Kurdistan.17 This "separation" threatened the Iranian 
t e r r i t o r ia l  in te g r i ty ,  and i t s  national un ity . This was the s itua tion  
when the Shah Mohammed Reza, who was 21 years o ld , came to power in Iran.
Immediately a f te r  his emergence to power in Iran , the young Shah 
f e l t  that the only solution fo r  the Iranian c r is is  was American support. 
Thus, he turned to the United States fo r  guarantees and support. Although
10
he could not convince Washington to t ry  to end the Soviet occupation, he 
hoped to use American prestige to pressure the A l l ie s ,
I I I .  AMERICAN STRATEGIC POLICY
From the turn o f the twentieth century u n t i l  the great depression 
of the 1930s, American foreign policy had been affected by the Monroe 
Doctrine. America l ive d  in sem i-iso la tion, fa r  away from the eastern 
hemisphere. Before World War I I ,  America's approach to the external 
world vac il la ted  between periods of is o la t io n is t  withdrawal and periods 
of global involvement.
World War I I  changed America's iso lationism. The war constituted 
an episode tha t both c rys ta l l ize d  a mood and acted as a ca ta lys t fo r  i t ;  
tha t resolved contradictions between the " is o la t io n is t "  and the " in te r ­
na t io n a lis t"  and helped c la r i f y  values; tha t set in motion a wave of 
events tha t eventually engulfed a nation and forced i t  to reach a 
consensus about i t s  ro le . Describing the American a tt itude  in  th is  
period, Gabriel Almond in his The American People and Foreign Policy (1950), 
wrote that the American people have not only had to accept world leader­
ship, but also had to learn how to contend with an opponent who subordiV 
nates a l l  values to power. Almond called American foreign po licy , the
foreign policy of "consensus" which aimed fo r  a resistance to communist
18expansion, by economic, d iplomatic, propaganda, and m i l i ta ry  means.
With i t s  entry in to  the war, the United States was transformed to 
superpower status. America emerged from the war with extraordinary 
powers and a new sense o f global re spo n s ib i l i ty .  To meet with the "new" 
American ro le  in world p o l i t i c s ,  America's leaders plunged in to  the job 
o f shaping the world in to  a mold suitable fo r  American security and 
in te res t.  Charles W. Icegley, in his American Foreign Policy (.1979) 
said, "The free people o f the world look to us fo r  support in maintaining
11
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th e ir  freedom.1 I f  we fa l te r  in our leadership, we may endanger the 
peace of the world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our
Because o f i t s  global re spo n s ib i l i ty ,  the U.S. became active in 
nearly every sphere o f  in ternationa l re la tions . America was the primary 
sponsor o f the United Nations. America pushed fo r  the expansion of 
foreign trade, the development of new markets fo r  American products and 
the creation of complex alliances in Europe and the Third World.
American foreign policy a f te r  World War I I  was generally a n t i ­
communist in nature. The reason fo r  th is  American a tt itude  toward the 
communists was because American policy-makers assumed that communism was 
an expansionist, crusading ideology in ten t on converting the en tire  world 
to i t s  be lie fs .  Moreover, communist ideology was to ta l i ta r ia n  and a n t i­
democratic, and therefore, a real threat to freedom and l ib e r ty  through­
out the world,
A good example o f a person with such an a tt itude  was John Foster
Dulles, who believed the communist was a "d e v i l . "  In order to thwart
adventurism, Dulles suggested tha t the U.S. lead an ideological crusade
with the ultimate goal o f reform o f the "ev il-doers" and the eventual
triumph o f  democracy. Dulles' p rinc ipal po licy was, however, the policy
'o f  "brinkmanship." The U.S. must not only have the m il i ta ry  ca p a b il i ty ,
but i t  must also have the w i l l  to carry out such a po licy , while at the
same time, negotiating fo r  a mutual and reciprocal renunciation o f force,
20self-defense.
The fr ie nd ly  wartime re la tionsh ip  between the U.S.S.R, and the U.S, 
shattered as the Soviet. Union expanded in to  Eastern and Central Europe.
na tion ." 19
13
By the end of World War I I ,  i t  became obvious that the world o f the
Yalta Declaration, in which the Soviets had committed themselves to free
elections and democratic governments in Eastern Europe, had become
meaningless. Explaining the reasons behind th is  Soviet aggression,
George F. Kennan wrote that the Soviet leaders were insecure about th e ir
p o l i t ic a l  a b i l i t y  to maintain power against forces both w ith in  Soviet
/ 's o c ie ty  i t s e l f  and in the outside world. This insecurity  would lead to
21an ac tiv its --and  perhaps hostile --Sov ie t foreign po licy.
The Americans f e l t  tha t they were responsible fo r  the replacement 
of the B r it ish  in the Middle East (a f te r  B r i ta in 's  withdrawal) from the 
area), to keep the power balanced. The Americans saw the Soviet expan­
sion throughout the Third World as a threat to the balance of power. 
Washington feared that Soviet communism would be able to present i t s e l f  
as a successful model of modernization fo r  the new nations seeking to 
enter in to  indus tr ia l modernization. Thus, communism was not ju s t  a 
m i l i ta ry  th rea t, but also an ideological threat in the newly p o l i t ic a l ly  
aware and poor area o f the Middle East. For the people of th is  area, 
communism was a ttra c t ive  because i t  appeared to promise a f a i r l y  rapid
and d isc ip lined  way of bringing about p o l i t i c a l ,  soc ia l,  economic, and 
22cu ltu ra l changes.
The in ternal d i f f i c u l t ie s  o f  the Third World contries in general, 
and s p e c if ic a l ly  Middle Eastern ones, attracted the Soviet Union and the 
United States and led them to a dangerous confrontation. This confronta­
t io n ,  which developed a f te r  World War I I ,  was also known as the Cold War. 
Because o f the balance o f power, and also the rapid western need fo r  the 
Persian Gulf o i l ,  the United States formulated a new set o f po lic ies
14
which became America's new s tra teg ic  po licy . The major aims of th is  
policy were to keep the flow o f o i l  to America and other western nations, 
and also to protect American a l l ie s  in the region.
Iran was one of the f i r s t  areas which attracted American attention 
because Iran suffered from internal and external problems, Because of 
the mismanagement and in terna l corruptions, Iran lived in economic misery. 
Because o f  the a l l ie s '  occupation of tha t country, Iran lo s t her indepen­
dence and security . The Iranian c r is is  threatened the security and 
s ta b i l i t y  o f the whole Persian Gulf region.
15
The United States should take the lead in running the world in 
the way that the world ought to  be run.
Harry S. Truman, 1945
IV. FIRST SHIFT
In the years 1945-1947 the U.S. government was extremely careful in 
i t s  re la tionship with Iran. The attention o f American policy makers 
moved toward the Persian Gulf. Washington was beginning to realize the 
s tra teg ic  importance o f Iran in terms o f her location in the region and 
because o f her economic importance with respect to o i l .  Many American 
policy-makers understood tha t i f  Iran f e l l  to the Soviets, a l l  western 
economic and p o l i t ic a l  in terests in the region would become vulnerable 
to Soviet influence. Thus, America began to support Iran 's  desire fo r  
independence. I t  was the beginning of the f i r s t  s h i f t  in American policy. 
The re la tionship b u i l t  because both countries, Iran and the United States, 
had common in terests and common enemies.
Iran 's  New Importance in American Strategic Policy
Until 1939, Iran was not very important in American s tra teg ic  policy.
The United States had neither s ig n if ic a n t m i l i ta ry  and economic interests
in  Iran, nor were there many Iranian voters compared to those of other
ethnic groups, such as the I r is h ,  in the United States. A fte r  a l l ,  the
American government did not l ik e  Reza Shah's po licy . The s itua tion
changed dramatically only a f te r  Reza Shah's death in 1944, when Washington
began to commit i t s e l f  to the security o f Iran, and hence, gradually
replace B r ita in  as a new superpower in the region. While the B r it ish
position as a leading world power was in decline, the position o f the •
23United States as superpower was on the r ise .
The Americans were very careful o f  th e ir  involvement in Iran because 
both the Russians and the B r it ish  were America's a l l ie s .  American
16
17
diplomats and in te ll igence agents tended to sympathize with the Iranians
and were sometimes c r i t i c a l  of the behavior o f London and Moscow policy 
24makers. Washington wanted as much information as possible about the
Iranian s itua t ion .
In 1941« t he American Commission of Experts submitted a report to
President Roosevelt. In that report, the Commission stated th a t  the
center o f the world 's petroleum output was s h if t in g  to the Persian Gulf.
At the same time, the American Special Emissary, Mr. Patrick Hurly, a fte r
his return from a Middle East v i s i t ,  advised the President tha t the United
States should support the Shah. Mr. Hurly added that "Washington should
help Iran in bu ild ing a democratic government based upon a system of 
25free enterprise ."
Mr. John Jernegan's report was one of the best ever w r it ten  about 
Iran at that time. Mr, Jernegan was a State Department Middle East 
expert. He learned that the only way to avoid fu rthe r trouble in the 
region would be to strengthen Iran so i t  would be able to stand on i t s  
own fee t, and hold firm  against the two European powers. Jernegan added 
that the "Russian po licy  had been fundamentally aggressive and the British 
policy fundamentally defensive in character." He seemed to believe that
the resu lt  o f  both the Russian and B r i t is h  po lic ies  was the interference
9 f i
in  the in terna l a f fa irs  o f Iran.
President Roosevelt became interested in Iran, He was looking fo r 
some way to help Iran with her economic misery and at the same time stay 
neutra l. The President was looking fo r  long-range American in te res ts .
He said, " I f  we can get the r ig h t  kind o f  American experts who w i l l
18
remain loyal to th e ir  ideals, I feel certain that our po licy o f aiding
27Iran w i l l  succeed."
In December, 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and S ta lin  met in Tehran fo r  
a conference of great s ign ificance. One o f the things discussed a t that 
conference was the Iranian issue. President Roosevelt was pushing the 
a l l ie s  fo r  Iranian independence. The conference f in a l ly  ended with the 
Tehran Declaration, in which the three great powers promised to preserve 
Iran 's unity and independence. The Declaration was a great v ic to ry  fo r
Iranians and was the basis fo r  an American obligation to protect Iran and
28to furnish large-scale aid.
America's p ractica l in terests seemed to require a strong Iran, free 
from in ternal weakness and dissensions tha t breed foreign in tervention.
A weak Iran might provoke c o n f l ic t  between the Soviet Union and B r ita in  
or an im pe r ia l is t  p a r t i t io n  by the two. I t  would be fa r  be tte r fo r  Iran 
to become an example o f A l l ie d  cooperation in the post-war period. Since 
the United States waspopular among Iranians and had few material interests 
of i t s  own in that country, the Roosevelt Administration believed America 
would be the best guardian o f I ran 's  sovereignty as a free nation.
The economic s itua tion  o f  Iran was serious. In 1942, the Iranian 
government asked America fo r  help. They asked fo r  an American financ ia l 
mission to bring order in to  finances and the troubled economic s itua t ion . 
The American government answered p o s it ive ly . They chose Dr. A. C. 
Millspaugh, who had worked in Iran before, to head the new American 
economic mission to Iran, Millspaugh arrived in Iran in January, 1947.
To give him more room and f l e x i b i l i t y ,  the government o f Iran appointed 
him as D irector General o f Finance. Millspaugh, along with 70 other
19
Americans, worked in the M in istries o f Treasury, Finances, Food, and
Price S ta b il iza t io n , the national banks and customs. Millspaugh's
extensive control over Iranian finance and the economy was c la r i f ie d  by
the so-called Full Powers Law. His purview included finance, banking,
29government industry, commerce, and emergency wartime controls.
Millspaugh's major goal was to introduce a new income tax b i l l .  He 
thought such a b i l l  would help the government balance i t s  budget. 
Millspaugh also worked to improve grain co llec t ion  and government 
subsidies. Millspaugh saw his mission as a foundation fo r  the future 
American re la tionsh ip  with Iran. He subsequently wrote, "Our control o f 
revenues and expenditures not only served as a s ta b i l iz in g  influence, 
hut also was indispensible to the f u l l  effectiveness of Americans in 
other f i e l d s . " ^
Millspaugh's e f fo r ts  brought opposition from both conservatives and 
reformers in Iran. The conservatives saw Millpaugh's programs in te r ­
fe ring  V i th ~ th e ir  in te rests . The reformers' objection was Millspaugh's 
fa i lu re  to cope with high prices or indus tr ia l in e ff ic iency . When 
Millspaugh tr ie d  to f i r e  the head of the National Bank in la te  1944, the 
s itua tion  became worse. F ina l ly ,  the opposition caused the mission to 
resign, with most o f  i t s  program having had l i t t l e  e ffe c t .  There is no 
doubt, however, tha t Millspaugh's e f fo r ts  brought a change in the Iranian 
economic s i tu a t io n . '^
The United States sent a small m i l i ta ry  mission headed by Colonel H. 
Norman Schwarzkopf to reshape the Gendarmery (borderguards), in Iran.
The goal o f th is  mission was to reorganize the in ternal security force 
and help the government of Tehran stand on i t s  feet.
20
The Russians did not l ik e  the American attempt to reshape the 
economy and the security o f Iran. They were suspicious about America's 
real in tention in Iran. The o i l  development in 1944 made the s itua tion  
more complicated.
Attempting to strengthen America's involvement as a counterweight 
to occupying powers, the Iranian government, once again, inv ited  
American o i l  companies (Standard Vacuum and S inc la ir)  to negotiate fo r  
possible concessions in the North. Northern Iran was s t i l l  under Soviet 
occupation.
The Soviets, too, sent a delegation of th e ir  own. The Russians 
reminded the Iranian government tha t Moscow had at f i r s t  offered Finland 
easy terms, but la te r ,  a f te r  tha t country resisted, was forced to accept
32much less favorable arrangements. Iran should not make a s im ila r  mistake.
Moscow demanded, an o i l  concession that would cover a l l  f iv e  northern
provinces o f Iran, stretching from Azerbaijan (northwest) to Khorasan
(northeast), under Soviet occupation. The Soviet objective in th is
demand was to rebuff American and any fu rthe r B r it ish  demands fo r  o i l
concessions, and thereby to undercut the influence of these two powers
in Iran. These Russian demands put the Iranian government in to deadlock.
I t  was impossible fo r  the Iranian government to accept the Russian demand,
ye t, i t  was not possible to refuse i t .  Iranian government postponed a l l
negotiations fo r  o i l  concessions u n t i l  a f te r  the war. Both the Americans
and the Soviets would have to wait. The creater o f th is  law was a Majlis
(Parliament) member named Muhammad Mossadeq, who la te r  would lead the
33f ig h t  to  nationalize o i l  in Iran.
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The Final confrontation between America and the Soviet Union over 
Iran was about the Soviet withdrawal from the country. The f in a l date 
fo r  troop withdrawal, "as agreed at the three powers foreign m in is te rs ' 
conference o f September 1945. had been set fo r  March 2, 1946. But as 
the war neared i t s  end, the Soviet Union continued to strengthen i t s  
forces in Northern Iran. This Russian a tt itude  angered the Iranian 
government, and they found that there was no solution fo r  th is  s itua tion  
but to se t t le  i t  in the United Nations. In January , .̂19-46. the Iranian 
government, with B r it ish  and U.S. support, formally charged the Soviet 
Union before t he Security Council under the United Nations Charter with 
creating "in ternationa l f r i c t io n "  by interference in Iranian in ternal 
a f fa irs .
The dispute over Iran, which so fa r  had been kept at the regional
le ve l,  f in a l ly  assumed i t s  place in the arena of global p o l i t ic s .  The
Soviet Union, in defending i t s  presence in Iran, introduced formal
charges against B r ita in 'o ve r  Greece and Indonesia, and argued that the
Security Council is. not "capable o f handling issues l ik e  these.1* The
Russian Communist newspaper, Izve s t ia , provocatively questioned the
le g a l i ty  o f the presence o f American troops in Iran. I t  questioned how
th e ir  presence without a trea ty  with the Iranian government " ta l l ie s
35with Iran 's  sovereignty and independence."
The Iranian Cris is contributed to r is in g  American suspicious of 
Moscow's real in ten tion . The Soviet behavior also influenced American 
policy. Moscow's action in Iran , as well as neighboring Turkey and 
Eastern Europe, heightened the United States.'•■ suspicions toward S ta lin 's  
postwar in tentions. W. Averell Harriman, the United States Amhassador
to Moscow was busy analyzing the Russians' real goal. He wrote in 
January, 1945, that "Moscow's policy seemed to use occupation troops, 
local communist parties, labor unions, sympathetic l e f t i s t  organizations 
and economic pressure to establish regimes outwardly independent, but in 
practice subservient to the Kremlin,"
President Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt, d istrusted the Soviets
even more than Roosevelt had. For President Truman, the dispute over
Iran was no longer regional. He wrote, "Russian a c t iv i t ie s  in  Iran
threatened the peace o f the world,". He added tha t,  " I f  the Russians were
to control Iran is o i l , e ithe r  d ire c t ly  or in d ire c t ly ,  the raw material
balance o f the world would undergo serious damage, and i t  would be a
37serious loss, fo r  the economy o f western world." America's response 
to the Soviets was the Truman Doctrine, o f March, 1946, which was 
acclaimed by the Iranians as a fu rthe r demonstration o f the American 
in te res t in th e ir  security.
The American pressure, f in a l l y ,  forced Sta lin  to withdraw Soviet, 
troops in 1946, leaving the autonomous republics he had sponsored in 
Kurdistan and Azerbaijan to be crushed by the Shah's troops. Iran 's  
economy continued to be dominated by the British-owned Anglo-1 rani an 
Oil Company (AIOC). During the la te  fo r t ie s  and early f i f t i e s ,  I ra n 
was convulsed with p o l i t ic a l  ag ita tion  fo r  the nationa liza tion  o f AIOC. 
The National Front ( i . e . ,  l ib e ra l and on the whole secular), led the 
campaign fo r  na tiona liza tion . Both the Communist Party (Tudeh) and 
Islamic a c t iv is ts  joined the campaign, but sought, whenever possible, to 
capture i t s  leadership fo r  themselves. The Shah was caught in the middle, 
try ing  to play the various groups against each other and to mediate.
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between na tion a lis t  demands and great-power in te res ts . Iran, which had 
e a r l ie r  been seen as a tes t case fo r  post-war Anglo-American-Soviet 
cooperation, had now become a decisive battleground in the emerging Cold 
War.
Imperialism is  fo r  us; a long cow with i t s  head in the Middle 
East, where i t  is being fed, and i t s  udders in B r i ta in ,  where*' 
i t  is  being milked of i t s  o i l .
Adi 1 Husain, an Egyptian Nationa lis t
V. THE SECOND SHIFT
The second s h i f t  in U.S. policy toward Iran occurred when the 
United States started to support Iran_publ i c ly .  In th is  s h i f t  the 
Iranian-American re la tionsh ip  c rys ta l l ized  and developed to form the
strongest a lliance which the II.S ba.d-i.n~t he..geje&iao...Gu l f ,.region.
Although th is  re la tionsh ip  weakened during the Iranian nationa liza­
t ion  of i t s  o i l  industry, i t  started to get even stronger a f te r  Prime 
M in ister Mohammed Mossadeq was overthrown by a m i l i ta ry  coup.
During the second s h i f t ,  the U.S. administration helped the Shah's 
regime economically and m i l i t a r i ly .  The U.S., through the American 
Technical Cooperation, helped the Iranian economy. I t  was because of 
th is  program and Iran 's revenue from i t s  o i l  that Iran started to depend, 
on i t s e l f .  Iran became a successful example fo r  the Third wo r l d ^ > ^ j ^ _ ^ ^ ^ ^
countries. The rapid communist expansion in the Middle East and the
- 4*
Arab nationalism movement threatened the Shah's regime. To keep Iran 
safe from these threats, the U.S. and the Shah started a new program to 
^modernize the Iranian armed—fox&es.
During th is  s h i f t  the Shah succeeded in establishing his absolute 
rule in Iran by cen tra liz ing  a l l  powers in his hands.
Mossadeq's Oil Nationalization: A Threat to the Anglo-American Strategic 
In te rest in the Persian Gulf
One o f the most fascinating developments in Iranian p o l i t ic s ,  a f te r  
the war, was the emergence o f Dr. Mohammed Mossadajq to power. Born to a 
wealthy landlord family in 1881, Mossadeq, l ik e  the Shah, had studied in 
Switzerland. He returned to Iran in 1906 to work as a c iv i l  servant in
26
education and provincial government. More than once he had run afoul o f 
Reza Shah and had been forced out o f public l i f e .  As an increasingly 
in f lu e n t ia l  Majlis member during World War I I ,  he developed his concept 
of "negative equ ilib r ium ." The concept simply meant that rather than 
appease the Great Powers, by granting them equal concessions, Mossadeq 
would argue tha t they should be kept in dynamic balance by being kept at 
arm's length. Mossadeq had also consistently advocated the creation of 
a parliamentary democratic system with the power o f monarchy lim ited  and 
regulated by law, the exertion o f Iran 's  ownership and control over i t s
resources, p a r t ic u la r ly  o i l ,  and the implementation o f rapid, fundamental
38socio-economic reforms.
By the year 1950, Mossadeq gained increasing supports both inside
and outside the M ajlis  (Parliament), from the newly formed National
Front (Jebhe-Melli) ,  which was a loose grouping o f diverse elements;
the Iran Party, Tudah.Party, Neo-Nazi Sumka Party, the U ltrana tiona lis t
Pan-Iran Party, the re lig ious  fanatics of the Duties o f Islam, and
followers of the Sayyed Ab.ol Qasem Kashani. Mossadeq emerged as a
39leading spokesman of the Front.
Mossadeq advocated the assertion o f Iran 's  ownership and control of 
i t s  o i l  industry. The underlying considerations were to maximize Iran 's  
income from i t s  most viable source o f capita l and minimize the reasons 
fo r  both B r i t ish  d irec t a c t iv i t ie s  and Anglo-Soviet r iv a l r y  in Iran.
As a resu lt o f the la t te r ,  Iran 's  re la tions would improve with the 
Soviet Union and would be used as leverage against the B r it ish  influence 
in Iran. He wished to  harness Iranian resources in order to in i t ia te  
and implement s tructu ra l p o l i t ic a l  and socio-economic reforms. The
27
popularity o f Mossadeq's program was greatly  assisted because the
monopoly of the Iranian o i l  industry contro lled by B r i t is h  Petroleum
(BP), which owned the AIOC, had proved to be very costly  fo r  I r a n . ^
Iran started i t s  nationa liza tion  o f o i l  on March 15, 19iTl, when the
Iranian M ajlis  voted unanimously to nationalize the o i l  industry in Iran,
i . e . ,  AIOC. The nationa liza tion was confirmed by the Senate f ive  days
la te r .  At the same time, Parliament ordered the Shah to appoint Mossadeq
as Prime M in ister. A fte r  his a rr iva l to power, Mossadeq declared AIOC
nationalized on May 1, and in re turn, promised compensation. Mossadeq's
design fo r  the nationa liza tion was based on the fac t tha t Iran had the
r ig h t ,  as a sovereign independent country, to nationalize i t s  o i l
industry. He countered th is  act w ith concession agreements. Exports of
o i l  halted, the great Abadan re fine ry  shut down, and by October 1951,
41the la s t  o f the B r i t is h  Petroleum employees had sailed fo r  home.
The f i r s t  Iranian challenge to the o i l  companies h i t  B r it ish
Petroleum in te res t throughout the Middle East very seriously. Iranian
nationa liza tion  was more than a confrontation between a company and a
country. The B r i t is h  government owned the con tro ll ing  in te res t in
B r i t is h  Petroleum. The B r it ish  o i l  men muttered tha t Iran could not
42nationalize B r i t is h  government property—though i t  had.
B r i t is h  Petroleum boycotted Iranian o i l  and arranged fo r  a l l  i t s  
friends, to jo in  the boycott. I t  then sat back and waited fo r  Dr. Mossadeq 
to collapse. He did not oblige. Without an a l l y ,  without exports, w ith ­
out money, Dr. Mossadeq and Iran held out. Iranian nationa liza tion o f 
i t s  o i l  became a very important issue in the West. For example, there 
was Time' s lu r id  p o r t ra i t  o f Mossadeq in i t s  January, 1952,
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"Man-of-the-Year" story on him:
In his p la in t iv e ,  singsong voice he gabbled a defiant challenge 
that sprang out of a hatred and envy almost incomprehensible to 
the West. There were m il l ions  inside and outside o f Iran whom 
Mossadeq symbolized and spoke fo r ,  and whose fanatica l state o f 
mind he had helped to create. They would rather see th e ir  own 
nation f a l l  apart than continue th e ir  present re la tions with the 
West...He is not in any sense pro-Russian, but he intends to 
s t ick  to his po lic ies even though he knows they might lead to 
control o f Iran by the Kremlin.43
In la te  September, 1951, Great B r ita in  ordered an embargo on Iranian 
o i l  and in s t i tu te d  what amounted to an economic blockade o f that country. 
Unable to break the embargo almost un iversally  obeyed by BP1s competitors, 
the Iranian economy, dependent fo r  i t s  health on o i l  revenues, began to 
feel the pinch.
For understanding the Iranian Nationalization, i t  is  very useful to 
look at the summary d ra ft .  This d ra ft  was adopted by the Iranian Special 
Oil Committee on April 26, 1951; amended and approved by M ajlis  on April 
30; and promulgated by the Shah on May 2, 1951.
B r ita in  submitted i t s  complaint to the ICJ (In ternationa l Court o f 
Justice), and took part in  negotiations with the Iranian government 
which ended in a hopeless and deadlocked case. B r i ta in 's  immediate 
reactiori, a f te r  Iran 's na tiona liza tion of AIOC, was economic warfare-- 
f i r s t ,  by using "gunboat diplomacy" by sending the HMS Maritius in to  the 
Persian Gulf, and by re in forc ing  i t s  troops in Iraq; and second, by 
putting economic pressure on Iran. For tha t reason, B r it is h  Petroleum 
obtained an agreement with i t s  s is te r  in ternationa l o i l  companies not to 
enter in to  any agreement w ith Iran replacing the AIOC. BP and Aramco 
immediately doubled th e ir  production in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and I r a q . 45
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The economic blockade o f Iran produced serious problems fo r  the ^  
Mossadeq government. The en tire  Iranian o i l  industry came to a v ir tu a l
to almost n i l , increased Iran 's  economic p l ig h t ,  and i
s tra in  on the implementation o f Mossadeq's promised reforms. In January
o f 1953, due to the increasing economic and p o l i t ic a l  d i f f i c u l t ie s ,
Mossadeq's coa lit ion  began to break up.
I f  the United Kingdom gave in to Mossadeq, they would not only lose
prestige, but would also cripp le  the BP and the B r it ish  economy. I t
would also threaten investments and other in terests  in the Persian Gulf
47and the Middle East in the face of growing nationalism.
The Soviet Union took advantage o f the s itua tion  and supported
Mossadeq's nationa liza tion  of the western o i l  industry, and hailed
Mossadeq's n a t io n a lis t  stance. Moscow also urged the Tudeh Party
(Iranian Communist Party) to support Mossadeq in his e f fo r ts .  Meanwhile,
Tudeh supported Mossadeq pub lic ly . By giving support, Tudeh gained
strength, a f te r  a decline o f  influence in the 1940's, through the
nationa liza tion  period. With a push from Moscow, Tudeh led s tr ikes .
These demonstrations helped push Iran toward a n t i -B r i t is h  and a n t i-
American po lic ies . The general l ine  of Tudeh in  th is  period was to t ie
in popular na t io n a lis t  demands and slogans with arguments suggesting
that Iran would be bette r o f f  to sever i t s  t ie s  with the West and re ly
48on Soviet trade and good w i l l .
The B r i t is h  government was looking fo r  "any way" to deal with the 
Mossadeq government. As has been mentioned, the B r i t is h  government
s ta n d s t i l l ,  with o i l  production dropping from 241.4 m il l io n  barrels in
4fi1950 to 10.6 m il l io n  in 1952. This action reduced
asked the I.C .J. fo r  judgment in the dispute. The judgment o f  the
^ in ternationa l Court o f Justice in  the case of the United Kingdom v. Iran
was rendered on July 22, 1951. The Court, by a vote of nine to f iv e ,
found tha t i t  had no ju r is d ic t io n  in the case; i t  also accordingly ruled
49that i t s  order o f provisional measures ceased to be operative.
On September 28, the United Kingdom delegation requested from the 
Security Council o f the United Nations a "complaint o f fa i lu re  by the
Iranian government to comply with provisional measures’ indicated by the
50I.C .J. in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case.
The B r i t is h ,  f in a l ly ,  asked the Americans fo r  help in th e ir  c o n f l ic t  
w ith Mossadeq. Although the o i l  c o n f l ic t  was p r im arily  a matter between 
the B r it is h  and the Iranians, i t  involved the United States as we ll. 
O f f ic ia l ly ,  the United States proclaimed i t s  n e u tra l i ty ,  but rea liz ing  
tha t a solution was v i ta l  to  i t s  own in te res ts , acted u n o f f ic ia l ly  to 
bring about a settlement of the d ispute--at f i r s t  through mediation. 
I n i t i a l l y ,  the United States favored the Iranians and urged the B r it ish  
to make concessions. Soon the intransigence o f Dr, Mossadeq and some of
his close followers in the government drove the Americans in to  a united;
51fro n t with the B r i t is h ,  against the Iranians.
A? the o i l  negotiations wore on and the United States refused to ^  
come to Iran 's  f inanc ia l rescue, the Nationalists became increasingly 
disappointed and b i t t e r ,  and Iran i an-American re la tions suffered 
accordingly.
A fte r na tiona liza tion , Mossadeq and his followers apparently 
expected American n e u tra l i ty .  They also thought that the U.S. would 
give Iran loans to deal w ith the economic c r is is ,  and that the U.S.
A
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would purchase o i l  from Iran, Mossadeq was convinced that the American
position would not change:
Mossadeq believed the Americans, who had no stake in the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company, would suppoftnTaTTdnalizatioru This; be 1 ie f  
was based on America's resentment towards B r i ta in 's  role in  the 
region and the influence flowing B r it ish  involvement in AIOC. 
Mossadeq's misreading o f the scene was not e n t ire ly  his fa u l t  as 
the American Ambassador in Tehran, Henry Grady, encouraged th is  
view. The Americans sided with the B r i t is h ,  at f i r s t ,  merely t o 
.ensure that the~ nationa liza tion TfTdTwDrJ  ̂ Then, they feared 
( th a t the Soviet Union might exp lo it  the s itua t ion  and thus, the 
\outlawed Tudeh Party would gain ground in Iran. This led them to 
{consider the more drastic solution o f overthrowing Mossadeq.52
The reason behind the American s h i f t  in foreign policy (from neutral 
to anti-Mossadeq), was the Cold War. The Soviet Union supported the 
Iranaian action in nationa liz ing  i t s  o i l .  The Eisenhower Administration, 
under growing pressures form American global strategy against communism, 
^^and  as a resu lt o f B r it ish  propaganda (supported by the Iranian conser­
vatives) had been convinced tha t a re l iab le  a lte rna tive  to Mossadeq's 
administration would be a government headed by the anti-communist, pro- 
Western monarchy. In a dramatic turnabout, Washington hardened i t s  
position against Mossadeq. When Mossadeq appealed d ire c t ly  to Eisenhower 
on May 28, 1953, fo r  American economic assistance to improve i t s  economic 
pressures which were caused by AIOC and the B r it ish  government, Eisenhower 
refused to ass is t. He said, " I t  would not be f a i r  to the American tax­
payer fo r  the United States government to extend any considerable amount 
o f economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds
53derived from the sale o f i t s  o i l  i f  a reasonable agreement were reached.
American backing o f the B r it is h  pos it ion , produced animosity in 
•^Iran toward the United States. The United States aims had generally 
been thought d if fe re n t from Great B r i ta in 's .
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The loss o f o i l  revenue, decline in o i l - re la te d  employment, and 
deteriora tion o f economic re la tions with B r ita in  and the United States, 
continued to s tra in  the Iranian economy. In 1952, the Shah and his 
foreign advisers wanted Mossadeq out, as did the AIOC and the new 
B r it is h  conservative government under Churchill.  In late 1952, the Shah 
dismissed Mossadeq and appointed a new prime m in is ter. The Shah's
r-............................................................. • •
decision was met by massive demonstrations. The Shah, under pressure of
the Iranian people, returned Mossadeq to o ff ice  again. Mossadeq returned
to power with special hatred fo r  the Pahlavi fam ily , especially the Shah's
twin s is te r ,  Ashraf, In rapid succession, Mossadeq sent Ashraf abroad
with re t ire d  senior army o ff ice rs  suspected of harboring ro y a l is t
lo y a lt ie s ,  stopped d is tr ib u t io n  of crown lands on the ground that these
possessions were acquired i l l e g a l l y ,  (and therefore, were not to be
treated as part o f the royal patronage) and circumscribed the royal F ia t
w ith in  the M a jlis . In mid-1953, the Shah and his wife ran away f r o m ^ y ^
54Iran to Baghdad and then to Rome.
Mossadeq was faced w ith the new problem of how to run the o i l  indus­
try  in Iran. Neither Mossadeq nor his advisors had any concept o f the 
problems involved in running a major company. They d id n 't  have the 
fa in te s t  idea of how to se ll  th e ir  o i l  on in ternationa l markets without 
a tanker f le e t  or d is tr ib u t io n  system of th e ir  own. This s itua tion  
complicated the o i l  c r is is  even more. Mossadeq, also, started having 
problems w ith the re lig ious  leaders and with the Tudeh. The re lig ious 
leaders became aware of the threat o f communism to the whole Islamic 
system and to the way of l i f e  of the Iranian people. They began to 
realize the danger o f possibly slipping by default in to  the loss of
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independence to the Soviet Union while struggling to be free from 
B r i t a in . ^
By the beginning o f  1953, there had developed a c lear break between 
the National Front and the Tudeh Party. The Front was expecting the 
f u l l  support o f the party at that c r i t i c a l  time, yet the party was 
c r i t ic a l  of Mossadeq and the Front fo r ,  what i t  charged as, fa i lu re  to 
continue the struggle to i t s  log ica l conclusion. The problem, which 
Mossadeq and the National Front faced over Tudeh support, was a c r i t i c l  
one. The problem was one o f mutual support at various c r i t i c a l  stages 
o f the large struggle.
To increase public confidence, Mossadeq attempted to control the
army, but fa i le d  in th is  attempt, because the army was s t i l l  loyal top<
the Shah and influenced by i t s  American advisors. The ro ya l is t  group
was the most e ffec t ive  group w ith in  the Army.. This group of o ff ice rs
was secretly planning fo r  a m i l i ta ry  coup. Meeting regu larly  at the
o f f ic e r 's  club in Tehran, a group of m i l i ta ry  commanders re t ire d  by
Mossadeq decided to form a secret committee. The group was headed by
General Fazallah Zahedi. The group then established contact with the
B r it is h  Secret Service, and was financed in the beginning of 1953 by
the former AIOC. Moreover, the secret committee fu rthe r widened i t s
network and established connections with the American o f f i c ia l  in the
American Embassy in Tehran. The m il i ta ry  o f f ice rs  f in a l l y  succeeded in
56overthrowing Mossadeq on August 19, 1953.
The nature of the American involvement in Mossadeq's overthrow is 
not c lear. In his statement in 1954, Major General George C, Stewart, 
as: a witness in the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign A f fa irs ,
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mentioned tha t the U.S. m i l i ta ry  mission and MAAG (M il i ta ry  Assistance 
Advisory Group), played an in d ire c t ro le in supporting the Iranian Army 
and the Shah:
The Shah's government would not be in existence today 
except fo r the Iranian Army, and the Iranian Army maintained 
the a b i l i t y  to hold up i t s  head and stay loyal to i t s  t ra d i­
tional leader only because o f the self-respect that i t  attained 
through the assistance we had given i t .
Now, when th is  c r is is  came on and the thing was about to 
collapse, we vio la ted our normal c r i te r ia  and among other things 
we did, we provided the army immediately on an emergency basis 
? the need tha t permitted and created an atmosphere in which they 
could support the S h a h .. . i f  i t  had not been fo r  th is m i l i ta ry  
program in Iran, tha t country would no longer be on the side of 
those countries a l l ie d  with the United States.57
General Stewart was the Director o f  the Office o f M i l i ta ry  Assis­
tance in the Department of Defense of the United States.
The coup would not have succeeded without s ig n if ica n t in ternal 
d isa ffec tion  or indifference w ith in  Mossadeq's c o a l i t io n ,  but without 
outside aid, the coup would not have succeeded,
Mohammed Mossadeq was undoubtedly one o f  the most fa s c in a t in g  and 
unique personalit ies in 20th Century p o l i t ic s .  Mossadeq was well adapted 
to the requirements o f Iranian p o l i t ic s .  To draw in large numbers of 
Iranians who had never before been p o l i t i c a l l y  active , Mossadeq had to' 
emphasize the dramatic. His whole strategy was to embody Iran person­
a l ly ,  i t s  problems and i t s  requirements, Mossadeq's defense o f  Iran 's  
independence, his hate o f AIOC,. his charisma, and his overthrow by the 
m i l i ta ry  with foreign f inanc ia l support helped make him an enduring 
^na t io n a l hero. Oppositionists o f the most varying views ( le f t i s t s ,  
l ib e ra ls ,  secular and re lig ious  groups), invoked his name, cherished 
his p ic tu re , and found appropriate quotations from him to support th e ir  
views,
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X Western opinion, often ignorant and condescending toward Iranian 
p o l i t ic a l  cu ltu re , generally fa i le d  to understand the very pragmatic 
nature o f Mossadeq's approach to the special f lavo r o f Iranian sta te­
c ra f t .  While Mossadeq's personality and p o l i t ic a l  ideology were fa r 
from those o f Ayatollah Khomeini, both the movements they led and the 
tac t ics  they employed had a good deal in common. Indeed, Western media 
descriptions o f Mossadeq might be free ly  interchanged with th e ir  
portrayals o f Khomeini twenty-five years la te r .
As the Shah returned home, the armed forces proceeded to dismantle 
A the National Front as well as Tudeh. They arrested Mossadeq and 
executed most of the members of the Mossadeq government and Tudeh Party. 
The regime could feel confident that i t  had eliminated the organization, 
i f  not the appeal, o f both Tudeh and the National Front. The Shah, l ike  
his fa ther Reza Shah, could now ru le without an organized opposition.
CO
History had come f u l l  c i r c le .
Mossadeq's n a t io n a lis t  government was replaced by a pro-western, 
pro-Shah government which was headed by General Zahedi. Also, the 
Eighteenth M ajlis  had been elected during Zahedi's term as prime minister.. 
This M ajlis  was composed la rge ly  o f pro-Palace landlords, conservative 
merchants, and deputies who had supported the Shah during his confronta­
t ion  with Mossadeq. The Shah, by now, had achieved substantial power
59oyer parliament and his prime m in ister.
The Shah had, also, discovered a new source o f guidance and support— 
the United States o f America. The Americans now began th e ir  support fo r  
the Shah's regime openly, which indicated the beginning of the Second 
S h if t  in  American s tra teg ic  po licy. This new change in American policy
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was clear and d is t in c t  in Secretary John Foster Dulles' disclosure to
the House Foreign A ffa irs  Committee;
At th is  time [mid-1953) non-communist forces, encouraged fay 
our aid and fr ie nd ly  in te res t over the past two years, took 
measures to ensure that Iran would,turn toward the free world—
The fac t tha t during the two years, the United States had kept
a live  the confidence of p a t r io t ic  Iranian elements in our a b i l i t y
and willingness to help contributed to t ipp ing the balance in 
favor o f loyal non-communist Iran ians.60
While the B r i t is h  government of the day also opposed Mossadeq’ s
machinations, i t  was the American support (caused by the r is in g  power of
the Tudeh Party in Iran ), which was e ffec t ive  in bringing back the Shah,
The most important issue in the Shah's agenda, a f te r  the improvement
c / o f  in ternal s ta b i l i t y ,  was to f in d  a settlement fo r  the o i l  c o n f l ic t
between Iran and AIOC, and other o i l  companies. The Shah turned to his
American fr iend  fo r  help and advice about the o i l  issue. The American
administration helped him reach a solution in 1954. Especially important
in putting Iran back on i t s  feet was the o i l  agreement the United States
helped negotiate between Tehran and the petroleum corporation, or the
consortium. William Forbi.s,in his Fall o f Peacock Throne (1980), said,
" I t  was Herbert Hoover, Jr. who f i r s t  thought up the idea o f a consortium.
He was President Eisenhower's adviser on petroleum a f fa i r s ,  and the
moment the Shah was safely back on the Peacock Throne, he flew to Tehran
fil
to look over the o i l  s i tu a t io n ."
According to th is  new agreement between Iran and o i l  companies, two 
foreign-owned, management-operating companies would carry out the explor­
ation and re fin ing  o f Iranian o i l  under a contract with the National 
Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and they would se ll the product to a new 
consortium. The o i l  production was thus divided in to  the following
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proportions: 40 percent fo r  AIOC, 14 percent fo r  Shell O i l ,  6 p e rc e n t^
to the French Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, and 40 percent to the 
American o i l  companies (Exxon, Gulf, Texaco, Mobil and Socal).
Although the 1954 o i l  settlement solved the o i l  c o n f l ic t  between 
Iran and the foreign o i l  companies, i t  was ce rta in ly  a step backward 
from Mossadeq's design fo r  an a l l- I ra n ia n  o i l  industry.
The emergence of Mossadeq, the Cold War, and Iran 's  s tra teg ic  
importance in the Persian Gulf, were the reasons fo r  a new t ie  between 
the United States and the Shah of Iran. A fte r  Mossadeq,:s departure from 
power, and because o f mutual in te res ts , the United States started i ts  
technical cooperation and arms sales to Iran. I t  was the beginning of 
a new s h i f t  in the p o l i t ic a l  development between Iran and the United 
States,
Cold War: The Impact of Soviet-American Confrontation on Iran
The 19.40 s are known as the beginning o f the Cold War era. The 
Soviet Union and the United States endeavored to impress each other with 
th e ir  m i l i ta ry  might, technological achievements, economic potentia l and 
p o l i t ic a l  princ ip les in order to  weaken each other's moral s ta b i l i t y  and 
the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f domination over Europe and the Third World. According 
to Hans Of, Morgenthau's description of the Cold War in his book P o l i t ic s  
Among Nations, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and America 
has affected the rest o f the world as we ll,  Morgenthau said, "They tried 
to  impress th e ir  a l l ie s ,  the members o f the hostile  a ll iance , and the 
uncommitted nations with these same q u a l i t ie s . "  Morgenthau added tha t 
the superpower aims were "to keep the allegiance of th e ir  own a l l ie s ,  
weaken the unity  o f the hostile  co a li t io n ,  and win the support o f the
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uncommitted nations." Morgenthau explained tha t because of these 
confrontations, the world divided in to  two power blocs which faced each 
other l ik e  two figh te rs  in a short narrow lin e . In between these two 
blocs is  the Third World. . They can advance and meet in what is  l ik e ly  
to be combat, or they can threaten and allow the other side to advance 
to , what to  them, is precious ground.^
Since.the beginning of the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine has been 
the base o f American foreign po licy . With the world s itua tion  as i t  was, 
the United States soon adopted anti-communism as a national ideology. 
Armed with th is  d r iv ing  force, the United States Government was deter­
mined to f o i l  the spread o f communism at every turn c o l le c t iv e ly  with
65other democratic nations, or tha t f a i l in g ,  u n i la te ra l ly .
John Spanier in his American Foreign Policy (1983) stated that the 
Truman Doctrine transformed the U.S. from a position o f great weakness 
and vu ln e ra b il i ty  in to  one o f re la t ive  strength. Spanier said, "The 
^Truman Doctrine had prevented a Soviet breakthough in to  southeast Europe 
and the Middle East and established Western Europe's flank in the eastern
c a
Mediterranean." The Eisenhower Doctrine, on the other hand, had drawn 
y  a clear l in e  between American and Soviet spheres o f influence. President 
Eisenhower in his book, The White House Years; Waging Peace (1965), 
re fe rr ing  to American post-war foreign po licy , wrote;
The United States lo s t  no foot o f the free world to communist 
aggression, made certa in that the Soviet Union and China under­
stood the adequacy of our m i l i ta ry  power, and dealt with them 
f irm ly ,  but not arrogantly. We regarded our friends as respected 
partners and valued partners and t r ie d  always to create mutual 
confidence and t ru s t ,  well knowing that without these ingredients 
a lliances would be of l i t t l e  enduring va lue.67
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One o f the reasons behind the Eisenhower Doctrine was the collapse 
y. of the n a t io n a lis t  government in__CjiiD£. Expansion o f communism through­
out Asia and the creation of the communist government in China had 
weakened the Western position in Asia, which sh ifted  the balance of power 
in the East against the United States. The Russian's a tten tion , mean­
while, turned to the Far East and the Middle East.^^
The Middle East was the most important part o f the Third World 
because o f i t s  o i l  and i t s  location between Europe, A fr ica , and Asia.
For B r i ta in ,  th is  area--and especia lly the Suez Canal--had t ra d i t io n a l ly  
been the l i f e l i n e  o f  i t s  old empire and of i t s  present Commonwealth.
Above a l l ,  Europe's economy was becoming increasingly dependent upon 
Middle Eastern o i l .  Without o i l ,  Europe would collapse. The power that 
could deny i t  th is  o i l  would be able to d ic ta te  i t s  fu ture. Soviet 
influence in the Arab world might thus allow Moscow to neutra lize Europe
without f i r in g  a shot. In short, fo r  the Soviet Union, the Middle East
69was the means to outflank and d is integrate NATO,
Middle Eastern in s ta b i l i t y ,  fo llow ing the Suez c r is is  o f November,
1956, drew American a tten tion . President Eisenhower, on January 15,
1957, requested tha t Congress sponsor a jo in t  resolution which would 
o f fe r  economic aid to the Middle Eastern nations desiring such assistance 
in the development o f economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of 
national independence. To guarantee the in te g r i ty  o f such nations, the 
resolution added that " i f  the President determines that the necessity 
thereof, the United States is  prepared to use armed force to assist any 
o f such nations against armed aggression from any country contro lled by
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in ternationa l communism."'7® A good example o f th is  new American commit­
ment to defend the Middle Eastern nations was Iran;
The Government o f [ I ra n ]  is  determined to res is t  agression,
In case o f aggression against [ I ra n ]  the government of the 
United States o f America, in accordance with the Constitution 
o f the United States of America, w i l l  take appropriate action, 
including the use and arm force, as may be mutually agreed 
upon and as envisaged in the Jo int Resolution to Promote 
Peace and S ta b i l i ty  in the Middle East, in order to assist the 
Government of [ I ra n ]  at i t s  request.71
Under the impulse of Cold War p o l i t ic s  and American global opposition to 
communism, Washington had expressed i t s  w ill ingness, p r io r  to the over­
throw o f Mossadeq, fo r  an a lliance with Iran as a member o f a regional 
pact, In February, 1953, President Eisenhower professed a d e f in ite  need 
fo r  a U.S. sponsored "system o f a ll iance" in the Iranian region against 
what he called the enemies [communist] who are p lo tt in g  our destruction. 
His Secretary o f  State, John Foster Dulles, subsequently envisaged the 
concept o f  the "Northern T ier" a ll iance , comprising Turkey, Pakistan and 
Iran. He believed tha t these countries were aware o f th e ir  common enemy, 
communism, and tha t they could not only defend themselves with American
support, but also could prevent the spread of communism throughout the
72en tire  Middle East in general, and the Persian Gulf in pa rt icu la r .
The reason behind American concern about th is  area was the emergence 
of the Persian Gulf as a major focus of in ternationa l r iv a l ry .  The 
B r it is h  withdrawal from the area raised the issue o f the security and 
s ta b i l i t y  o f the Gulf. The communist penetration throughout the region 
worked as a recipe fo r  the Cold War,
The Russians seemed to  be seeking domination over the Gulf because 
of i t ' s  growing importance as ch ie f supplier o f o i l  to the energy-th irsty 
indus tr ia l West and Japan. A number o f studies on the Soviet role in  the
Middle East showed tha t in 1940 the Soviet government o f f i c ia l l y  declared 
i t s  t e r r i t o r ia l  aspirations to be south o f national te r r i to r y  o f the 
Soviet Union, in the d irec tion  o f the Indian Ocean. This general s ta te­
ment was subsequently refined by Foreign Commisar V. Molotov's communica­
t ion to the German ambassador to Moscow;. The statement read, "The area 
south of Batum and Baku [ I ra n ]  in the general d irec tion  of the Persian 
Gulf is recognized as the center o f the aspirations o f the Soviet 
Union.1,73
The expressions o f s t r iv in g  fo r  southward expansion were regarded 
as indications of long-range interests; o f  the Soviet Union in  the 
f i f t i e s  and s ix t ie s .  The f in a l  goal of such a Soviet po licy would be to 
dominate the Gulf region e ith e r  d ire c t ly  or through the instrum enta lity  
o f c l ie n t  and s a te l l i te - lo c a l  regimes. The Soviet viewpoint was that 
the "vacuum" l e f t  in the Gulf, by the B r it is h  withdrawal, was not 
allowed to ex is t  fo r  long. I t  would soon be f i l l e d  by the "agressive" 
presence o f the United States—a country bent on domination of local 
states and greedy exp lo ita t ion  o f th e ir  resources through i t s  o i l  monopo­
l ie s .  Therefore, Moscow engaged in re lentless a c t iv i t y  to reduce American 
influence in the Gulf, especia lly in I ra n .7^ To do tha t, the Russians 
concentrated on the c o n f l ic t  between the Persians and Arabs over the Gulf, 
supported the Arab nationalism movement in the region, and discredited 
the ro le o f the United States by creating anti-American propaganda.
The Gulf area witnessed momentous changes in the 1960s, The source 
of these changes came from the continuance of communist expansion in  the 
area, such as, the conclusion o f Soviet-Iraq Treaty o f Friendship and 
Soviet assistance to Iraq i o i l  resources, the downfall o f South Yemen
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and the growing o f Soviet and s a te l l i te  influence in that country, the 
Soviet support fo r  the Dhofar rebell ion on Oman and the Iranian in te r ­
vention, and the Soviet support fo r  the Arabs' claim over the Gulf's 
Is la n d s .^
The geographical complexity o f the Persian Gulf is another source 
of these co n f l ic ts  between the Arabs and Iran in which the Soviets took 
the Arab side. The Persian Gulf has some unique features. Some 500 
miles long, and with a width varying from 180 miles to 21 miles, the 
Gulf has many features which make i t  a hatching ground fo r  p o l i t ic a l  
c o n f l ic t .  There is  no other marine body of comparable size in the world 
surrounded by so many d if fe re n t  p o l i t ic a l  un its . Coastlines vary from 
fewer than 20 miles—fo r  Iraq and some of the emirates—to 635 miles fo r  
Iran. With great d ispa r ity  in endowment o f coastlines, and with so many 
independent e n t i t ie s  presenting claims to the offshore seabed, the stage 
is set fo r  c o n f l ic t .
There are two physical characteris tics  which greatly increase the 
potentia l fo r  offshore c o n f l ic t .  F irs t  is  the shallowness o f the Gulf. 
Only in the S tra i t  o f Hormuz is  the Gulf as deep as 100 meters, and i t s  
average depth is  less than 40 meters. Thus, a l l  o f the seabed is geo­
graphically a continental she lf and subject to claim. Moreover, most of 
the Gulf's o i l  is  eas ily  explo itab le. Second, there is a complex asym­
metrical coastal configuration. The Arabian peninsula is  a giant t i l t e d  
block, in c l in in g  very gradulaly from southwest to northeast. The general 
resu lt  is  tha t the Gulf is  especia lly shallow along the western shores. 
At low t id e ,  there are certa in stretches of over 20 miles offshore that 
are completely uncovered, and there are numerous small islands. On the
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Iranian side, however, there is  a steeper descent to the sea f lo o r ,  and 
re la t iv e ly  few islands. I t  is  from the Gulf's' geographical complexity, 
p o l i t ic a l  and physical, tha t most Arab-Irani an problems o r ig in a te d .^
A fter his emergence to power, President Gamal Abel Nasser, started 
his Arab-National ism (or Pan-Arabism) movement. Nasser' s Pan-Arabism 
movement, centering in Cairo, warred on the governments of the individual 
Arab states with the goal o f creating a greater Arab unity . The emergence 
of Nasser in the Middle East was a golden opportunity fo r  the Soviet Union. 
Moscow expressed i t s  to ta l support fo r  Nasser's attempt to unite the Arabs. 
By supporting Nasser, the Soviet Union could a lign i t s e l f  with Arab 
Nationalism, Nasser did not regard the METO (Middle East Treaty Organiza­
tion) merely as a means of containing the Soviet Union; he saw i t  as an 
instrument to preserve Western domination throughout the area. Thus, by 
having the Soviets on his side, he set out to destroy the Baghdad Pact by 
forming counter a lliances and by undermining pro-Western Arab govern­
m ents,^
Behind these developments remained a l l  the essential problems that 
had given r ise  to the turmoil a f te r  1955: the co n f l ic ts  among the Arab
States, the Arab-Israeli quarrel, the overshadowing competition between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and, above a l l ,  Arab nationalism 
and i t s  movement throughout the Middle East.
The Shah was monitoring these developments with extreme care, The 
explosion of coups, revolutions, wars, and c iv i l  s t r i f e ,  which marked 
Arab p o l i t ic s  of the 1950s and T96Qs, na tu ra lly  made the Iranian 
leaders nervous:. For the Shah, such disquieting events included Nasser's 
r ise  to Arab, leadership, Egypt and Syria 's a lliance with the Soviet
Union, Nasserist attempts to overthrow Jordan's King Hussein, and the
1958 c iv i l  war in Lebanon.
The Middle East reverberated with the sounds of crashing thrones.
In July, 1958, there was a m i l i ta ry  coup in the neighboring country o f
Iraq, where the Hashemite royal family was massacred and pro-Moscow
General Abud Karem Kassim's regime in s ta lled . The Iraqi m i l i ta ry  coup
resulted in an a lliance with the Russians. Secret Soviet arm shipments
79to Baghdad, in the fo llowing months, doubled Iraq 's armed forces.
Moscow, also, launched another campaign to entice Iran out o f the 
Baghdad Pact, o ffe r ing  in exchange, a long-term nonagression pact. At 
the same time, the Soviets pressured the Iranian government in to  cooper­
ation. Soviet Premier N ik ita  Khrushchev to ld  Iranian Ambassador Msud 
Ansari, in  the autumn of 1959, that the neutral Iran could obtain "ten 
times" as much American aid, as well as Soviet assistance. Khrushchev 
added, "unless the Iranians changed th e ir  ways, Moscow might invoke a 
fo rty -year-o ld  treaty with Iran [repeatedly disclaimed by Tehran] per-
on
m itting  Soviet m i l i ta ry  action against foreign bases on Iranian s o i l . "
By the beginning o f  the 1960 s, Iran was s t i l l  the central issue of 
the Cold War in the region. Egypt broke her diplomatic re la tions with 
Iran in 1960 because Tehran continued i t s  diplomatic t ies  with Is rae l. 
Arab na tiona lis ts  launched a l l -o u t  propaganda attacks against Iran. 
Persian se tt le rs  in the Arab countries and especially in sheikdoms of 
the Gulf were denounced as part o f a p lo t  to steal these lands from the 
Arabs. Syria, Iraq and other Arab states supported a " l ib e ra t io n  move­
ment" claiming Iran 's o i l  r ich  southwestern province o f Khuzistan [which 
they called Arabistan] fo r  the Arab world.
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The Soviets used the power of media against the United States and
her a l l ie s  in the Persian Gulf. The major focus of the Russian controlled
media was the United States po lic ies and behavior in the broader Gulf
area. The Soviet propaganda described America as an im peria lis t country
bent on establishing i ts  hegemony over the region...as an a l ly  o f Zionism
and local reactionary forces. The Soviets media characterized the United
States as a state continuously in te r fe r in g  with the internal a f fa irs  of
the local country through the CIA, " in  spying and hatching plots of
81a lliance with the Iranian SAVAK and Is ra e li  in te l l ig e n ce ."
The major aim of the Russian media was the Gulf nations, because the 
masses in these countries remained very poor and suffered from i l l i te ra c y .  
Thus, they became a good market fo r  the Russian media.
With the regional s itua tion  becoming more and more fr igh ten ing , 
quick American support was necessary. The American leaders' genuine 
concern over these external threats to Iran was fu l l y  matched by th e ir  
continued b e l ie f  that in ternal problems such as Soviet occupation of 
northern Iran and Mossadeq's na tiona liza tion o f the o i l  industry posed 
the major danger to the country's s ta b i l i t y .  I t  was fo r  these reasons, 
and also because o f the Shah's desire to improve the Iranian armed 
forces, tha t the United States started her arms sales to Iran. Iran 
became highly important in American stra teg ic  po licy in the Persian Gulf
op
region. But before discussing the arms sales, i t  is necessary to 
examine the U.S, technical cooperation program, begun during the Cold 
War Era, which put special emphasis on Iran.
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American Technical Cooperation
In 1949, the United States adopted the Point Four Plan (a term 
continuing technical and economic cooperation in needy countries). The 
United States under the Truman Administration was expected to invest 
b i l l io n s  o f do llars in Latin America, Asia, and A frica  in order to help 
the people in those areas achieve a se lf-susta in ing rate o f  economic 
growth, to develop th e ir  natural resources, and to aid in transforming 
backward societies in to  modern, urbanized, indus tr ia l nations.
Iran is a good example o f those underdeveloped areas. The United 
States started to pay special a ttention to Iran a f te r  World War I I .  
American stra teg ic  policy gradually discovered that Iran should be 
strengthened to the point where i t  could be master of i t s  own house, and 
thus, be in a good position to take care o f i t s  own defense, A weak and 
vulnerable Iran would only in v ite  disorder and "predatory strength" 
which would give rise to trouble. To have a c lear p icture o f th is  part 
of the American s tra teg ic  po licy , i t  would be useful f i r s t  to define the 
Point Four Program, and second to discuss i t  in terms of the Iranian 
case.
What was the Point Four Program?
Point Four was the term applied to the continuing technical coopera­
t io n  program of the United States from 1950 through 1965. President 
Truman announced that the United States would extend technical assistance, 
designed to help free people in the world to help themselves by producing 
more food and c lo th ing , and by improving th e ir  standard o f l iv in g .  This 
was to be one of four major p i l la r s  o f the United States foreign policy.
47
Its  objectives were in l ine  with the aspiration o f men everywhere fo r  
improved agricu ltu re , more education and better health.
On January 20, 1949, President Harry S Truman announced the plans 
as follows;
F irs t ,  we w i l l  continue to give unfa lte ring  support to the 
United Nations and related agencies, and we w i l l  continue to 
search fo r  ways, to strengthen th e ir  authority and increase th e ir  
effectiveness.
Second, we w i l l  continue our program fo r world economic 
recovery.
Third, we w i l l  strengthen freedom-loving nations against 
the dangers o f aggression...
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program fo r  making the 
benefits of our s c ie n t i f ic  advances and indus tr ia l prograss a va il­
able fo r  the improvement and growth o f underdeveloped areas.83
More than ha lf  the people in the world are l iv in g  in conditions 
approaching misery, the President said. Their food is  inadequate, they 
are victims o f disease, and th e ir  economic l i f e  is p r im it ive  and stagnant. 
Their poverty is  a handicap and a threat both to them and to more pros­
perous areas.
The President added tha t fo r  the f i r s t  time in h is to ry , humanity 
possesses the knowledge and the s k i l l  to re lieve the suffering of these 
people. The President stated tha t, "Our aim should be to help the free 
peoples o f the world, help them through th e ir  own e f fo r ts ,  to produce
more food, c lo th ing, materials fo r  housing and more mechanical power to
on
l ighten th e ir  burdens,"
This plan should be a cooperative enterprise in which a l l  nations 
work together through the United Nations and i t s  specialized agencies 
wherever practicable. Guarantees to investors must be balanced by 
guarantees in the in te res t o f the people whose resources and labor go 
in to  these developments.
48
President Truman added tha t a l l  countries, ''including our own," w i l l  
greatly benefit from a constructive program fo r  be tte r use o f the world's 
human and natural resources.
The s itua tion  in Europe started to improve a f te r  the Marshall Plan. 
The resu lt of American help to Europe was very impressive. The s itua tion  
was;, o f course, very d i f fe re n t in underdeveloped countries from tha t in 
Western Europe. In Europe, in 1947, the preconditions o f economic 
recovery were already present. The people were healthy, enterpris ing, 
l i te ra te  and s k i l le d .  Government c i v i l  services were well-established 
and w e ll-s ta ffed . Public services were highly developed, though disrupted 
hy war. The missing components—food, raw materia ls, replacement 
machinery—could easily be brought in from abroad. In the Third World, 
there was a need to s ta r t  everything from square one.
One important reason behind the American adoption o f  th is  plan was 
communist expansion throughout the Third World. Mr. Samuel P. Hayes, 
Special Assistant to the Secretary o f State, commented about th is  matter. 
He said that the expansionist drive of communist imperialism and the 
potentia l destructiveness tha t another war would characterize, would 
force us to seek, not a balance, but more l ik e ly  a preponderance o f power 
between what we th ink of as the free world and the captive Soviet world.
Hayes expressed the in tention  of the American administration even 
more c lea r ly  when he said tha t the administration cannot expect to 
entrust American security fo r  even a possible preponderance of power,
"we cannot confine ourselves to dealing with symptoms, We must go much 
deeper and t r y  to root out the g e rm ,. . " ^
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What was the Purpose of the Point Four Plan?
Besides humanitarian reasons fo r  helping the people in Asia, Africa
and Latin America, there were good p o l i t ic a l  and economic reasons. The 
p o l i t ic a l  reason was that these very areas were ideal breeding grounds 
fo r  communist ag ita tion .
Secretary o f State, Dean G. Acheson made th is  point very clear when
he gave his report before the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations
(1949). He mentioned tha t increasing numbers of people in underdeveloped
areas no longer accept poverty as an inev itab le  fac t of l i f e .  They are
becoming aware o f  the gap between th e ir  l iv in g  standards and those in
more highly developed countries. They are looking fo r  a way out o f th e ir
misery. They are not concerned with abstract ideas of democracy or
communism. They are interested in practica l solutions fo r  th e ir  problems
in terms of food, shelter and decent l ive lihood . When the communists
o f fe r  quick and easy remedies fo r  a l l  th e ir  i l l s ,  they make a strong
86appeal to these people.
The economic reason fo r  the Point Four Program was America's need 
fo r  the underdeveloped areas to produce raw materia ls, with a market to 
se ll the goods, America, with a l l  i t s  wealth o f natural resources, was 
s t i l l  a long way from being a s e l f - s u f f ic ie n t  nation. A fte r World War 
I I ,  America had become even more dependent on the o i l  from the Middle 
East and from Venezuela.
Economic development would not ju s t  bring America certa in practica l 
material benefits , new sources of materials and goods which i t  needed, 
and new markets fo r  the products: o f American farms and fac to r ies , but i t  
would also help AmericaKs friends in Europe, too. These fr iends, who
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depend fa r  more than America does on foreign goods and markets, would 
benefit in  s im ila r  ways, Mr, Francis H. Russell, the Director of the 
Office of Public A f fa irs ,  Department o f State, pointed out the importance 
of the Third World to Europe, He stated that i f  America re lies  on foreign 
sources fo r  some supplies, then Europe must depend on them fo r  the essen­
t ia ls  o f l i f e  i t s e l f .  He added that Europe cannot contemplate a prosper­
ous future without continua lly  expanding markets and new sources of 
imports. He accepted that the Point Four Program benefited America more
than the Third World, "We have more to gain by what we put in to  these
87underdeveloped areas than from what we get out o f them," said Russell. 
Point Four Plan and the Iranian Case
America started small economic assistance to Iran during and a f te r  
World War I I ,  The nationa liza tion  of Iranian o i l  stopped the American 
Technical Cooperation to Iran, fo r  a while.
With the downfall o f the Mossadeq government, and the new pro- 
American government in Iran, the American cooperation program continued.
An important charac te r is t ic  o f th is  period was the drastic  increase of 
American aid to Iran. Under i t s  various programs and agencies, including 
A.I.D. and the Export-Import Bank, the.United States provided the Iranian 
regime, from 1953 to 1957 alone, with a to ta l o f $366,8 m il l io n  in 
economic-financial a id, $250,6 m il l io n  which was in the form of a grant- 
in -a id  and $116.2 m il l io n  from a loan. The inflow of such aid continued 
at an average o f $45 m il l io n  a year from the next three years. In 1961, 
a time when the Iranian economy had fa i le d  to make substantial progress, 
Washington increased i t s  aid to $107.2 m il l io n :  $35 m il l io n  as a grant,
QO
and $72.2 m il l io n  as a loan.
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This increased aid, supplementing Iran 's  o i l  income, enabled.the 
Shah's regime not only to meet the need o f i t s  empty treasury, and i ts  
administrative and welfare expenditures, but also to ensure the implemen­
ta tion  of the remaining projects of the F irs t  Seven Years Development 
Plan (1949-1956). This plan had been s ta lled  during the nationa liza tion 
c r is is  and the entire  program o f the Second Development Plan (1956-1962).
Along with the inflow of American aid to Tran came a large body of
U.S, o f f i c ia l  advisors and technical experts, employees of aid agencies
and technicians from commercial organizations, and private investors..
They were to ass is t the Iranian government in i t s  economic planning and
a lloca tion  o f American a id, provide technical know-how, and establish
jo in t  ventures with both the Iranian government and entrepreneurs, who
were now once again confident tha t Iran was f irm ly  set in developing a
free enterprise system. In the late 1950s there were more than 900
American economic and technical experts active in various f ie ld s  in Iran,
They helped in d ra ft ing  and implementing Iran 's Second Development Plan,
which stressed the essential role o f both public and private sectors in
Iranian economic development and called fo r  increasing foreign investment.
At th is  time, the government had promulgated the law fo r  the a ttrac t ion
and protection o f foreign investment in 1955. The main object of th is
law was to encourage foreign pa rt ic ipa t ion  in economic development,
(p a r t icu la r ly  in the industr ia l se c to r) , safeguard the in te re s t o f
foreign firms (mainly against confisca tion), and upgrade foreign inves-
89tors to an equal status with private domestic investors.
The American investors played a major ro le in stimulating the 
banking system and, most importantly, in creating the Industr ia l and
52
Mining Development Bank of Iran in 1959. Following i t s  establishment,
the Bank was very important in promoting private industry and providing
f in a n c ia l,  technical and advisory assistance to private investors.
During the second h a lf  o f the 1950s, private investments more than
90tr ip le d  and the import o f  capita l goods increased s ix fo ld .
A number of key economic projects went to American firms, as an 
extension of the fac t that they were financed largely by U.S. aid and 
investment. Other foreign firms, which e ithe r helped the American firms 
(or were commissioned by them), or entered private contracts with Iran, 
were mainly West German, French and B r i t is h .  By the early 1960s, U.S. 
d irec t private investments in Iran were estimated to be in excess of 
$200 m i l l io n .91
At the same time, the United States was Iran 's leading partner, 
with the balance o f trade well in th e ir  favor. In 1963, fo r  example,
Iran 's imports from the United States amounted to $103.7 m il l io n  and i t s
92exports to the U.S. reached $40.4 m il l io n .  This rapid entrenchment 
of the American position in Iranian economic planning and operations was 
reinforced by American administrations.
The Result o f the American Assistance to Iran 
A fte r  Mossadeq's overthrow and the return o f the Shah back to the 
power in Iran, the U.S. government concentrated on assisting the Iranian 
regime by economic, m i l i ta ry ,  and p o l i t ic a l  means. Stempel analyzed the 
reason o f th is  new American support of the Shah was because the Elsenhower 
Administration favored the Shah. Stempel added, "Since the Shah approved 
of Western in i t ia t iv e s  in the Middle East, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact, 
a British-sponsored security a lliance against the threat of communism, in
93November, 1955." Secretary o f State John Foster Dulles, remembering
the in s ta b i l i t y  o f the Moss.adeq era, had to be talked in to the idea.
The U.S. became much more positive toward a potential regional role fo r
Iran a fte r  the Suez c r is is  in 1956, and increased i t s  economic and
m il i ta ry  aid to countries in the region, including Iran. Iraq withdrew
from the Baghdad Pact in March, 1959, a f te r  the revolution o f 1958, and
began receiving m il i ta ry  equipment from the Soviets immediately.
Concerned about the aftershocks o f the Iraqi revolution, Washington
signed a mutual cooperation agreement with Iran which committed the
United States to come to i ts  aid i f  the country were attacked.
The resu lt  o f  th is  American Technical Cooperation in Iran was
extensive. American involvement in Iran brought with i t  a great increase
in western social and cu ltu ra l influence, p a r t icu la r ly  among those
educated urban Iranians who found the Shah's regime and i t s  pro-western
stance desirable and benefic ia l.  This influence consolidated the
overall structure of Iran 's dependence on, and vu lne ra b iI t iy  to , the
United States. Iran 's socio-economic development and foreign policy
objectives became closely t ied  to the in terests o f the c a p i ta l is t  
94world.
Iran 's  in ternal problems in the 1950s and 1960s were s im ila r to 
those that would crop up a decade la te r .  In f la t io n  and mismanagement 
were out o f contro l. Economic expansion had greatly increased the oppor­
tu n it ie s  fo r  corruption, causing soaring land values, high rents, and 
food shortages. The cripp led, yet rapid development led to the need to 
redress the imbalance and, l ik e  other Third World countries, Iran sought 
more money from abroad—rather than retrenchment a t home—as the way out.
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The Shah expected a sw ift domestic consolidation o f his rule from 
Iran 's dependence on the United States and a lliance with the West. In 
th is  respect, his e f fo r ts  were indeed rewarding to some extent. By the 
end o f the 1950s, he had succeeded in establishing his ru le almost 
throughout Iran, and was surviving strong opposition in te rn a l ly  as well 
as externa lly .
A fte r improving Iran 's economy, the Shah's new taks was the m il i ta ry .  
He started the biggest m i l i ta ry  buildup in Iran 's  modern h is tory.
American Arms to the Shah
America's support fo r  Iran developed very rapid ly during the 
Eisenhower Administration. Most of the American assistance was of the 
m il i ta ry  or economic type. President Eisenhower approved the provision 
of $45 m il l io n  in economic aid. The amount o f American m il i ta ry  assis­
tance increased a f te r  Mossadeq's removal and the return o f the Shah.
For instance, between 1949 and 1952, the United States granted Iran $33
m il l io n  in m i l i ta ry  a id ; but between 1953 and 1957, the number rose to
96$500 m il l io n  which was directed to the Shah's armed forces. The Shah 
and his m i l i ta ry  men were obviously benefiting from American help, both 
through improved morale and through promises o f enhanced combat 
e ff ic iency . At the same time, the American support would accord Iran 
greater weight in i t s  search fo r  an expanded role in the Persian Gulf 
and adjacent regions.
A fte r  the improvement of the economic s itua tion  in Iran, the 
second track o f American po licy concentrated on the Iranian armed 
forces. In a sense, the Iranian m il i ta ry  was to serve as a "safety net" 
fo r  the palace i f  i t  were to be threatened again. The Americans may
have concluded that the Iranian m i l i ta ry ,  properly armed, trained and
indoctrinated, could act as a s ta b i l iz in g  force with or without a
monarchy. As Robert Pranger and Dale Tahtinen noted, the Iranian
m il i ta ry  became the object of a major campaign. They said, "In f is ca l
years 1953 through 1961 our to ta l m i l i ta ry  assistance to Iran was about
h a lf  the assistance we gave a l l  countries in the 1953-1969 period, and
97a l l  o f i t  was in the form of ou tr igh t grants."
American m il i ta ry  assistance deeply affected the modernization o f 
Iranian armed forces. Many Iranian m il i ta ry  o ff ice rs  were trained at 
academies and schools in the United States and Europe. More than 
25,000 Iranian o ff ice rs  and enlisted men learned English, fam ilia rized 
themselves with modern American m i l i ta ry  equipment, absorbed American 
m il i ta ry  doctrine, strategy and ta c t ic s ,  and in the process became 
fa m il ia r  with American in s t i tu t io n s  and princ ip les of government.
The overthrow of the Mossadeq government by a m i l i ta ry  coup in 
August 1953, changed Iran 's postwar s itua tion  in  many ways. These 
changes remained important fo r  a quarter century of ensuing d ic ta to r ia l 
ru le . The United States, which in the early postwar period had an 
uneasy partnership with B r ita in  in influencing Iran, now became the 
dominant foreign power in Iran. This dominance was reflected by the 
United States taking a 40 percent share in the o i l  consortium in 1954-- 
the same large m inority percentage tha t was held by the AI0C before 
Mossadeq's nationa liza tion . These American-Irani an o i l  developments 
were accompanied by growing m il i ta ry  supplies, advisers, c iv i l ia n  and 
governmental programs.^
56
By the la te  1950s, the Shah had consolidated his control over much
of the country, especia lly over the in te l l ig e n ts ia  and the urban working
class. Provincial governors used the gendarmerie and the town police to
t ig h t ly  supervise parliamentary elections and thus, control both the
99M ajlis and the Senate. In the meantime, the Shah showed a growing 
in te res t in modernizing Iran 's  economy and society, in making the country 
Western in character and, especia lly , in making i t  m i l i t a r i l y  s trong ., 
Western governments and corporations f e l t  safer with a centralized 
government under a pro-Western ru le r .  A pro-Western ru le r  would not 
allow into, power a regime, such as Mossadeq's, that might threaten 
economic and p o l i t ic a l  re la tions with the West.^®
The American administrations, in the 1950s and 1960s, were d is ­
tressed over growing radical forces in the Middle East. The Middle East 
contained nearly two-thirds of the world's known o i l  reserves, and the 
Persian Gulf region accounted fo r  almost one ha lf  of that to ta l 
The U.S. government was deeply concerned over the possible consequences 
coinciding with the B r i t is h  withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Their 
concern included a "domino theory" involving the overthrow o f the weak- 
Sheikdoms by radical Arab revolutionary forces. These were the reasons 
that the American-Irani an re la tionship grew rapid ly  and that the 
American stake in maintaining harmonious re la tions with Iran was so great.
The Egyptian president, Nasser, played an important role in the 
p o l i t ic s  o f the Middle East throughout the Cold War era. The emergence 
of Nasser in the Middle East was also a reason behind the rapid Iranian y ' 
m il i ta ry  buildup.
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The B r i t is h  government announced in 1958 i t s  in tention to withdraw
v i r tu a l ly  a l l  i t s  forces based east of Suez by 1971. This decision
threatened to change the m il i ta ry  balance in the Gulf. The Shah was
convinced tha t the B r it ish  withdrawal was his golden opportunity to be
102the dominant power in the Gulf.
The Shah was uneasy about a growing influence of Pan-Arabism and 
Arab republicanism from the stimulus of President Nasser, and a large- 
scale Egyptian involvement in Yemen sharpened his fears of future 
Egyptian encroachment in to  the Persian Gulf area. Between 1964 and 1971, 
Cairo replaced Moscow as the center o f danger in the Shah's eyes--an 
immediate danger because i t  was seen as a threat to Tran's economic l i f e  
l in e ,  the o i l  trade. The Shah feared that i f  hostile  forces gained 
control o f the Persian Gulf states, they would cut the outward flow o f 
Iranian o i l ,  and tha t might harm his regime. Therefore, the Shah 
started to build up his army, navy, and a i r  force fo r  an operation in 
the Persian Gulf to guard Iran 's  o i l  in s ta l la t io n s .
The Shah determined tha t a fu l l -s c a le  program fo r  modernizing 
equipment was required fo r  his regime. This program entailed replace­
ment of F-86 a i r c ra f t  with F-5s and F-4s, to be followed by F-14s. On 
the ground side, the M-47 tank was to be superseded by (upgraded)
M-98s, M-60s, the B r it ish  Chieftain and other hardware. The naval 
component was to dispense with the World War I I-c lass  fr ig a te  and coastal 
c ra f t  in favor of Spruance Class destroyers and related ships, a l l  
intended to transform the Imperial Navy in to a "blue ocean" force as 
rapidly as possible. In 1966 the Shah improved his co llec tion  of 
m i l i ta ry  hardware by adding B r i t is h  Hovercraft which provided Iran with
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the world 's f i r s t  f u l l y  operational Hovercraft squadron. The Shah com­
pleted the arms sale by adding I ta l ia n  Sea K i l le r  MK2 ship-to-ship
103missiles where needed fo r  Iranian destroyers.
Because o f the Vietnam War, the U.S. balance of payment s itua tion  
worsened. At the same time, Iran 's increasing o i l  revenues, based on 
r is in g  production, meant that the Shah had money to pay fo r  m i l i ta ry  
hardware. Iran 's o i l  production rose from 1.6 m il l io n  barrels per day, 
in 1965, to 3.0 m il l ion  in 1967. This number increased to 3.8 m il l  ion 
in 1971. Explaining the increase in American sales to Iran, John Stempel 
in his Inside the Iranian Revolution (1981) said, "Except fo r  a low 
period in 1971, the percentage of m i l i ta ry  sales fo r  cash and c red it  
s tead ily  increased. The U.S. actua lly  had begun to push arms sales much 
e a r l ie r ,  in 1966 and 1967, when President Johnson pressed corporations 
l ik e  McDonnel Douglas and Boeing to se ll m o r e . " ^  This corporation 
worked in tandem with the Pentagon, which sought to improve the U.S. 
balance of payments through such purchases to Iran.
The reason behind the American arms sale was because of the impor­
tance o f Iran in American m i l i ta ry  planning in the la te  1960s. I t  was 
conceived as a "free world" bastion in an otherwise turbulent region 
of the world, one tha t might conceivably play a s ta b i l iz in g  role not 
only in the Persian Gulf region but on the sea beyond. The Shah was 
encouraged by American o f f ic ia ls  to contemplate ju s t  such a ro le fo r  
himself and his nation in the period a f te r  the 1970s. This encourage­
ment also meant that the United States could count on continuing access 
to important radar stations in northern Iran from which Soviet s tra teg ic  
Weapons programs could be monitored. Actua lly , in 1971, the United
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States b u i l t  two radar centers in the Caspian Sea to monitor the Soviet 
m i l i ta ry  and stra teg ic movements.
Strategic moves, designed to strengthen the Shah's hand in the 
Persian Gulf, had preceded the emergence of Arab republicanism, and 
were continued vigorously throughout the 1960s and 1970s. A fte r the 
second m il i ta ry  coup in Iraq (the emergence of Ba'ath Party to power) 
in 1963, the Shah relocated Iran 's  o i l  export f a c i l i t i e s  from the vulner­
able river-locked c i ty  of Abadan on the Iraqi-claimed Shat-al-Arab River, 
to Kharg (or Khark) Island in the Persian Gulf, In 1972, he moved the 
Khoramshah Naval Base, also on the Shat-al-Arab, to Bander Abbas, an 
Iranian coastal town near the S t ra i t  o f Hormuz. In early 1970, Iranian 
forces occupied two s tra te g ic a l ly  important islands situated at the 
mouth o f the Persian Gulf--the Tunb and Abu Masa. The Iranian occupa­
t ion  of these islands sparked v io len t an ti- Iran ian  demonstrations in
105radical Arab countries such as Iraq and Libya.
The Shah's s tra teg ic  moves came along with diplomatic moves. The 
Shah sought improved diplomatic and commercial re la tions with the small 
countries scattered along the Persian Gulf shore. He was among the 
f i r s t  to recognize Kuwaiti independence in 1961. He cu lt iva ted good 
re lations with the Saudis, who became frequent v is i to rs  to Tehran. At 
the same time, Saudi Arabia and Iran cooperated f u l ly  in establishing 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 1979, the 
Shah renounced Iran 's long-standing claim to Bahrain and suggested a 
Bahraini referendum to determine the Island's future. Of course,
Bahrain chose independence, which the Shah fu l l y  supported.
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In 1972, the Iranian Imperial Army, by order from the Shah, became
involved in Oman. The Iranian involvement started when the sultan of
Oman sought Iranian assistance in suppressing the Dhofari rebels when
they began operating along Oman's border with South Yemen. The Shah's
action in Dhofar faced protests from Iraq and the People's Democratic
Republic o f  Yemen. These two Arab countries were the only two Arab
states in  the region who s t i l l  maintained a degree of ideological
h o s t i l i t y  toward the Shah. They protested against the presence of
1 OfiPersian troops on Arab s o i l .
The Soviet Union was nervous about the Shah's m i l i ta ry  buildup.
The Soviets used th e ir  propaganda weapon against the United States and 
her a l l ie s  in the Gulf region such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Soviet 
media decried the weapon transactions as a part o f p o l i t ic a l  strategy to 
ensure American control o f the o i l - r ic h  region. Similar complaints were 
voiced w ith regard to the United States shipments o f arms to Somalia 
a f te r  the la t te r 's  desertion from the Soviet camp.
Moreover, according to Soviet commentaries, arms sales had another 
nefarious aspect: they were designed to siphon o f f  petro-dollars from
the oil-producing states. Instead of serving the needs o f local economic 
development, Russian sources claimed the money generated by o i l  was being 
cyn ica lly  diverted to enrich the im pe ria lis t weapon p ro d u c e rs .^
Of course, Moscow did not mention anything about th e ir  involvement 
in Ethiopia, Yemen and Iraq. During the time of the Iranian m il i ta ry  
buildup, the Soviet Union started i t s  weapon transactions with Iraq-- 
Iran 's tra d it io n a l enemy.
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Iraq 's  m i l i ta ry  power was about 250,000 men. Since the early 1970s, 
the Iraqi government, using o i l  revenues (which before 1980 were about 
$30 b i l l i o n ) ,  spent $8 to $9 b i l l io n  on m il i ta ry  hardware, most of i t  
purchased from the Soviet Union. The shipping l i s t  included more than 
330 Mig, Sukhai, Tupolev, Supersonic Soviet "Backfire," f igh te rs  and 
bombers, along with tanks such as the standard T-54 to T-72, which is 
considered one of the world 's best. Iraq also turned to France to get 
m i l i ta ry  hardware. At th is  time (1973-1978), French arms sales to Iraq 
amounted to $2.2 b i l l io n .  France's sales to Iraq included 24 Mirage FI. 
Iraq also had an option on France's most sophisticated airp lane, the 
Mirage 2000.108
The re la tionship between Iran and Iraq was complicated even more in
1968, when Hasan al-Bakr headed the Ba'ath Party in Iraq. The Shah
perceived Hasan al-Bakr's new position as a major change in the regional
status quo and as a threat to Iranian security and s ta b i l i t y .  The Ba'ath
government's attempt to e xp lo it  the differences between Iraq and Iran fo r
domestic purposes reinforced the Shah's perception. As a re s u lt ,  the
Shah stepped up his f inanc ia l and m il i ta ry  support fo r  the Kurdish
secessionist movement in Iraq, and Ba'ath increased i t s  support fo r  the
anti-Shah groups. This s itua t ion  led to open c o n f l ic t  between the two
sides. These c o n f l ic ts ,  among other things, developed in to  a to ta l war
109between the two countries a f te r  the f a l l  of the Shah.
The Shah's problems were increased by the in s ta b i l i t y  o f the area 
from southeastern to southwestern Iran. The region included the border 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and p a r t ic u la r ly ,  the area around the 
Persian Gulf. Over the years, there were a number of developments
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(such as Baluchi independent movement) in th is  region that the Shah 
perceived as threatening to Iran.
The Shah worried about t r ib a l  problems which were caused by the 
Baluchi independence movement on the border between Iran and Pakistan. 
This movement was supported by the Soviet Union and India. Moscow's 
support o f Bangladesh and India in th e ir  1971 war with Pakistan has been 
interpreted by the Shah's regime as evidence of Soviet expansionist 
ambitions, focused, in p a rt icu la r ,  on the Indian Ocean. The Shah was 
ac tive ly  worried about the Soviet pincers movement to surround Iran by 
Soviet friendship trea ties  with India (1971) and Iraq (1972), and
suspected Soviet support fo r  the 1973 coup tha t deposed the Afghan
monarch, King Mohammad Zahir S hahJ^
The s itua tion  in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean convinced the 
Shah, to buy more weapons. The Shah needed only to  convince Washington 
to se ll more weapons. The Shah moved boldly and s w if t ly  to take advan­
tage o f the o i l  c r is is  in the 1970s. In January 1971, an OPEC confer­
ence was convened in Tehran. In that conference, the Shah seized the 
in i t ia t iv e  in proposing a s ig n if ica n t r ise  in the price o f o i l .  The 
in i t ia t i v e  was welcomed by attending Arab states whose major aims were 
to use OPEC as an instrument in th e ir  campaign against Is rae l. Despite 
i t s  t ies  to Is ra e l,  Iran would support the Arab cause i f  Washington 
fa i le d  to meet the Shah's m i l i ta ry  needs
In the years 1972-73, Nixon and Kissinger agreed fo r  the f i r s t  time 
in the Tong h istory o f postwar American-Irani an re la tions to se ll Iran 
v i r tu a l ly  any conventional weapons i t  wanted. The reason fo r  th is  new
American commitment was the 1973 Arab o i l  embargo. The eruption o f the
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fourth round o f Arab-Israeli h o s t i l i t ie s ,  in October, 1973, caused an 
Arab embargo on the sale o f  o i l  to western supporters o f Is rae l.
The Arabs united fo r  the f i r s t  time in the 20th Century. Their 
purpose was to use the o i l  as a p o l i t ic a l  weapon to pressure Israel 
a l l ie s .  Not only did President Nixon support the helping of Is rae l,  but 
so did the Congress and most o f American public opinion. Besides the 
United States, the Arab o i l  embargo included the Netherlands and some 
other European countries who were regarded as too sympathetic to 
Is ra e l .112
The Arab o i l  embargo did not have a major impact on the U.S., but
i t  was extremely serious on Europe and Japan. Lacking domestic sources,
by 1973 Japan had come to import over 99 percent of the crude o i l  i t
113consumed. About 40 percent o f th is  amount came from OPEC. The 
embargo convinced the Americans, more than ever, that they could not 
depend on Arab o i l  forever.
Because o f  the embargo, the connection with Tehran assumed even 
greater p r io r i t y .  Washington was now badly in need of Middle Eastern 
friends and a l l ie s .  The Shah had cooperated with the United States by 
abstaining from the embargo. He proved to the American administration 
that he was the "only" fr iend  which America could depend on. Hence,
Iran became the balance wheel in the region, the leverage state which 
would influence att itudes and po lic ies of neighboring governments.11^
Washington wished to maintain a strong m il i ta ry  presence in the 
Gulf region. I t  seemed that there were only two ways to accomplish th is :  
e ithe r by projecting American m il i ta ry  power in to  the area, or by f inding 
a strong a l ly  capable o f playing a strong m il i ta ry  ro le. The f i r s t
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option was almost impossible to execute under prevailing domestic p o l i t ­
ica l conditions. The second, by contrast, was readily  ava ilab le , since 
i t  met the requirements of the Shah as well as the Nixon Administration. 
These requirements were not only m i l i ta ry ,  but also economic and 
s tra teg ic .
The friendship between President Nixon and the Shah of Iran started
during the Eisenhower Administration. That friendship was strengthened
by the Shah's October, 1969, v i s i t  to Washington, and especia lly by
Nixon and Kissinger's v i s i t  to Tehran in 1972. The resu lt o f the Shah's
successful negotiation with President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger would be a
substan tia l ly  increased program o f m i l i ta ry  sales to Iran. These sales
involved the most advanced equipment produced by American arms manufac- 
115turers.
Because of OPEC's price increase in 1973 and the Nixon-Kissinger
support, the Shah could a fford to buy almost anything. The Shah now
became the strongest regional power in the area. As Barry Rubin said,
" Iran 's  transormation in to  a regionally  dominant power was made possible
by the 1969 Nixon Doctrine and by certain May, 1972, promises to supply
116the Shah the necessary weapons."
The growth o f U.S. m i l i ta ry  sales to Iran accelerated sharply from 
1973 on. According to a 1976 report by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, the United States sold more arms to Iran than any other 
country. The to ta l m i l i ta ry  sales to Iran in 1973 was $524 m il l io n .
The numbers in the fo llowing years were $3.91 b i l l io n  in 1974, $2.6 
b i l l io n  in 1975 and $1.3 b i l l i o n  in 1 9 7 6 .^
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Most o f these m il i ta ry  purchases to Iran were under d ire c t super­
v ision o f the United States M i l i ta ry  Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). 
The function of MAAG was to advise and assist the Iranian m inister o f
war, and other Iranian o f f i c ia ls ,  in matters concerning plans, organiza-
118t io n ,  administration and tra in ing .
The Shah took a l l  important decisions in to  his own hands, including
the planning o f future purchases. The Shah's a ttention was focused more
towards m il i ta ry  issues than toward economic or social and domestic
problems. In 1957 he established a new secret police called Sazmani
I t t i l a  ‘ at va Amniyat-i Keshvar (or National Security and Information
Organization). I t  became a notorious organization known as SAVAK. From
the beginning of SAVAK, the CIA and Mossad (the Israel In te lligence
Service) helped and assisted i t .  Explaining SAVAK's creation, Stempel
said tha t fo r  15 years a f te r  i t s  creation in 1957, SAVAK worked closely
with the CIA and Is ra e l 's  Mossad, two organizations which helped set i t
up. The reason fo r  the American in te ll igence  cooperation was, once
again, because o f the communist threat. Stempel added tha t, "Liaison
work between SAVAK and the CIA continued u n t i l  the overthrow o f the
Shah, because i t  was helpful to both sides with respect to the common
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threat o f the Soviet Union."
SAVAK was a f f i l ia te d  with the Office of the Prime M inister. I ts  
ch ie f was d ire c t ly  appointed by the Shah and held the position of 
assistant to the Prime M inister. From i t s  establishment, SAVAK bore 
a princ ipal respons ib il i ty  fo r  a l l  types o f in te ll igence  and counter­
espionage a c t iv i t ie s ;  fo r  preventing subversion, sabotage, and a l l  such 
a c t iv i t ie s  harmful to the security and independence of the State; and
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fo r  checking and prosecuting a l l  Iranian groups and ind iv iduals opposing
the Shah's regime. I ts  o f f ic ia ls  were members of armed forces, and by
v ir tu e .o f  i t s  duties, i t  shouldered many c iv i l ia n  re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s ,  thus
becoming, by fa r  the most e f f ic ie n t  organization in Iran. I t  soon grew
to become a brutal force in running the a ffa irs  of the state, under the
l  ?0Shah's d irec t contro l.
The Shah had also exercised control over the m il i ta ry  and the
security forces through a policy o f divide and ru le , which assigned
overlapping duties to separate organizations fo r  gathering in te ll igence .
The Shah divided the SAVAK in to  three d if fe re n t branches. The f i r s t
branch operated an extensive network of in te ll igence gathering units .
The second one was a special in te ll igence  bureau of SAVAK and was
headed by the Shah's former classmate and trusted fr ie n d , Hossein
Fardoust. The Third was an armed force branch which was charged with
the same functions as the other two branches. There were also more
d iv is ions, inside these branches. These div is ions included the town
121and c i ty  po lice, Imperial Guard, Gendarmeries and M il i ta ry  Police.
With these overlapping duties and functions, and acute r iv a lry  
among senior o ff ice rs  leading these organizations, there was very l i t t l e  
chance o f  any development, w ith in  or outside the m i l i ta ry ,  not reported 
to the Shah.
Now, the Shah achieved his biggest dream. By having a strong 
m il i ta ry  force and sophisticated in te ll igence  organization, the Shah 
became the most powerful man in the region. His power permitted him to 
play a complex game in which his personal ambitions could be accommodated, 
while ensuring a congruence of American and other in terests with the goal
67
and objectives of his government. The Shah's ambition was an exercise 
in jo in t  ventures and jo in t ly  perceived benefits which included: the
establishment o f escape routes fo r  Soviet defectors wishing to f lee  to 
the West, reverse penetration routes fo r  in te ll igence  co llec t ion , 
reconnaissance missions in to Soviet te r r i to r y ,  the establishment of 
border l is ten ing  posts to in tercept Soviet communications, the launching 
of jo in t  exercises to counter the e f fo r ts  of Arab te r ro r is ts  to desta­
b i l iz e  sensitive geographic areas, and the sharing of in te ll igence 
estimates on p a rt icu la r  countries of mutual concern to Tehran and 
Washington.
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I t  is  a new world tha t ca lls  fo r  a new American foreign po licy --  
a po licy based on constant decency in i t s  values and an optimism in our 
h is to r ica l v is ion.
President Carter's Address on Foreign 
A f fa irs ,  University of Notre Dame,
May 22, 1977.
VI. THE THIRD SHIFT
In the second s h i f t  o f American stra teg ic  po licy , the re lationship 
between America and the Shah developed rapid ly because of mutual in te res t 
and needs between America and the Shah's regime. I t  was clear that 
American in terests in the Persian Gulf were closely linked not only with 
Iran, but also with the Shah's regime. This close id e n t i ty  was a feature 
o f the years from 1953 to 1976 as well. Because o f th is  closeness, i t  
was becoming increasingly d i f f i c u l t  to distinguish American interests 
from those of the Shah. American stra teg ic  policy in that period was 
concerned with the necessity o f supporting the Shah's regime.
Carter's human r ights  po licy brought about the th ird  s h i f t  in 
American s tra teg ic  policy. In th is  s h i f t ,  there were major changes in 
American foreign policy and a new set o f values upon which the policy 
would concentrate.
The appearance of open opposition to the Shah would have l ik e ly  
occurred in any case, but i t s  form and timing were, to some degree, a 
consequence of the human-rights policy created by President Carter.
Also, the d iv is ion  and the confusion w ith in  the Carter Administration, 
over which po licy  should be followed in Iran, gave the opposition a 
golden opportunity to attack the Shah's regime.
Carter's Human-Rights Policy and the Shah
The human-rights po licy  gave American foreign policy a new image. 
Carter hoped that the expansion o f human r igh ts  would be the wave of the
future throughout the world and he wanted the United States to be on the
crest o f th is  movement. President Carter in his Keeping Faith (1982)*
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explained the aims of human r igh ts . He wrote that "Human rights was not
merely a matter o f reducing the incidence of summary executions or
to rtu re  o f p o l i t ic a l  prisoners. I t  also included the promotion o f
122democratic p r in c ip le s .. .*  Carter's aim was to change America's 
image throughout A fr ica and the rest of the Third World. Carter wanted 
to give the people and the governments in these countries a new con fi­
dence in America. He wished to f ind  valuable friends among peoples who 
had looked upon our country with suspicion and fear. Carter added that 
those regimes which were g u i l ty  o f v io la t ing  basic human r ig h ts ,  might 
be deprived of American support:
I was determined to combine support fo r  our more authori­
ta rian  a l l ie s  and friends with the e ffec t ive  promotion o f human 
r ights  w ith in  th e i r  countries. By inducing them to change th e ir  
recessive po lic ies we would be enhancing freedom and democracy...
The world was too complex to respond to the application of a few 
simple rules. But when our own friends committed serious v io la tions 
of human r ig h ts ,  th e ir  abuses have to be acknowledged, and they 
would have to be encouraged to change th e ir  po lic ies . There would 
also be cases when oppressed people could obtain freedom only by 
changing th e ir  own laws or leaders.123
Carter wrote tha t his major goal was to protect the peoples' basic 
r igh ts . He said tha t he was often c r i t ic iz e d ,  in the United States and 
abroad, fo r  aggravating other government leaders and s tra in ing  in te r ­
national re la tions. According to Carter, th is  group of c r i t ic s  did not 
rea l ly  understand his major in tention which was to help the people who 
were imprisoned or tortured or otherwise deprived of basic r igh ts .
Carter, admitted tha t his policy did not stop the v io la t ion  o f human 
r igh ts : "The abuse of human r ights  is s t i l l  a serious problem in  too
many lands. The world cannot be improved by one dramatic act or by one 
nation's trans ient po licy ; the wheels of jus t ice  turn slow ly--often very 
s lo w ly ."1^4
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Carter's human-rights policy was unique throughout the world. He 
had made a big s h i f t  in American foreign po licy . The human-rights po licy 
attempted to reduce the level o f m i l i ta ry  assistance programs, while 
simultaneously increasing appropriations in the area of economic and 
humanitarian assistance. In other words, American economic aid could be 
used to improve human rights standards of the Third World countries in 
Latin America, A fr ica and the Middle East.
Before he came in to  o f f ic e ,  President Carter had studied the record 
of abuses in d if fe re n t nations. Carter said tha t his source of informa­
t ion  was the United Nations, Amnesty International and other organiza­
tions. Because of close t ie s  between the U.S. and Iran, Carter put 
special emphasis on the Iranian case. E a r l ie r ,  in the 1976 presidentia l 
e lec tion , the President, s p e c if ic a l ly  named Iran as one of the countries 
in which America should do more to help protect c i v i l  and p o l i t ic a l
l ib e r t ie s .  When Carter became president, he questioned Iran 's  human 
125rights record.
From the beginning, the new administration in Washington pressed >c 
the Shah's regime to l ib e ra l iz e .  Carter's human-rights po licy had an 
immediate impact on both the Shah and the opposition. The former f e l t  
that the new president expected him to display at least some respect fo r  
p o l i t ic a l  l ib e r t ie s .  The la t te r  also f e l t  tha t the White House was 
w i l l in g  to protect moderate dissenters from SAVAK onslaughts.
Carter's human-rights program probably encouraged the in te l le c tu a ls  
in Iran to exchange and p e t it io n  th e ir  protests, an a c t iv i ty  which, in 
the past, would probably have involved j a i l  sentences. Now pe tit ions  
brought no immediate punishment, and although they were not published
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in the press or elsewhere, they did c ircu la te  from hand to hand and 
abroad. At the same time, these in te l le c tu a ls ' protests c ircu la ted , 
pressure from foreign human-rights groups l ike  Amnesty In te rna tiona l, 
the International Association of Ju r is ts ,  Iranian gue ri l la s , re lig ious 
groups and other opposition groups, kept up. Meanwhile, economic
126security and s ta b i l i t y  and social problems became increasingly acute.
Amnesty In ternationa l, which in the past had focused on p o l i t ic a l  
prisoners in the communist bloc, turned i t s  attention to noncommunist 
countries and discovered that Iran was one of the world 's worst 
v io la to rs  o f human r igh ts . The more conservative International 
Commission of Juris ts  in Geneva took the regime to task fo r  "systemat­
ic a l ly "  using torture  and v io la t ion  o f basic c i v i l  r ights of i ts  
c it izens. Also, the U na ff i l ia ted  International League fo r  Human Rights 
sent an open le t te r  to the Shah in which i t  accused the regime of
intensely abusing human r igh ts  and called upon him to " re c t i fy  the
127deplorable human rights s itua tion  in Iran ."
International organizations c r i t ic iz in g  the regime gave groups of 
Iranian exiles a chance to form th e ir  own human-rights committees that 
publicized the SAVAK a tro c it ie s .  Forming committees in London, Paris 
and New York, Iranian students organized street demonstrations to 
expose the regime's unpopularity and tarnish the favorable image of 
the Shah through the western mass media, p a rt ic u la r ly  in America.
The major aim of the Iranian human-rights groups was to u t i l i z e  
the American human-rights policy by publishing th e ir  grievances, hoping 
to widen the crack in order to change government po lic ies . In 1977 
several pe tit ions and open le t te rs  were c ircu lated. One le t te r ,  given
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much p u b l ic i ty  by the media, was from the leaders o f the National Front. 
The le t te r  was signed by men whose association with the Front dated back 
to Mossadeq. The le t te r  c r i t ic iz e d  the fa i lu re  o f the Shah's reforms 
and p a rt ic u la r ly  the disregard fo r  human r ig h ts ,  enshrined in both the
I O O
Iranian Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
I t  was because o f the human rights s itua tion  in Iran that the
Carter Administration was d is tan t from the p r io r  Kissinger-Ford po lic ies .
In early 1977, Carter's arm-export guidelines mandated that a l l  sales be
demonstrably in the national in te re s t,  tha t a quantita tive  ce il ing  be
placed on them, that the government more closely supervise companies,
and tha t the United States not be f i r s t  to introduce new weapons in to  a
region. That meant tha t Carter abandoned the 1972 United States-Iranian
understanding and returned to the previous arms-sales-review process fo r
the f i r s t  time in a decade. Carter was attempting to make a gradual
change rather than a dramatic change in Iranian-American arms sales.
These changes in American foreign policy upset the Shah's regime and
129increased the Shah's insecurity .
I t  was because o f the pressure from the American administration and 
the Shah's confusion of the new American foreign policy that the Shah 
v is ite d  Washington in November 1977. Although pub lic ly  Carter admired 
the Shah and promised to support the Shah's regime, p r iva te ly  the discus­
sion was to ta l ly  d i f fe re n t.  In his speech in Washington, Carter described 
Iran as "an island of s ta b i l i t y  in one o f the more troubled areas of the 
world." The President continued, " th is  is a great t r ib u te  to you, Your
Majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect, admiration and love
130which your people give to you."
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Priva te ly , President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary of 
State Vance, and National Security Advisor Brzezinski had met with the 
Shah to discuss the Iranian s itua t ion . At that meeting, Carter expressed 
his concern to the Shah about human-rights v io la tions in Iran:
You have heard of my statement about human r igh ts . A growing 
number of your own c itizens are claiming that these r ights are not 
always honored in Iran. I understand that most of the disturbances 
have arisen among the mullahs and other re lig ious leaders, the new 
middle class searching fo r  more p o l i t ic a l  influence, and students 
in Iran and overseas. Iran 's  reputation in the world is  being 
damaged by th e i r  comp!aints.131
When the President asked the Shah i f  there was anything tha t could 
be done to a llev ia te  th is  problem by closer consultation with the 
dissident groups and by "easing o f f  on some o f the s t r i c t  police 
p o lic ie s ,"  the Shah answered "NO!" The Shah added that there was 
nothing he could do about i t  because he had to keep those s t r i c t  po lic ies . 
The Shah explained tha t he had no choice but to be tough:
I must enforce the Iranian laws, which are designed to combat 
.communism. This is very real and dangerous problem fo r  Iran and, 
indeed, fo r  the other countries in my area and in the western 
w o r ld .. .the complaints and recent disturbances orig inate among 
the very troublemakers against whom the laws have been designed 
to protect our country. They are re a l ly  ju s t  a t in y  m inority , 
and have no support among the vast majority o f Iranian p e o p l e J 3 2
In tha t meeting, Carter was convinced that there was no reason to continue
the discussion of the human-rights issue with the Shah.
Carter's disagreement with Iran 's human-rights conditions, and his
d irec t c r i t ic is m  o f the Shah's regime disturbed the Shah. What worsened
the Shah's insecurity  was the a tt itude  of the American Congress toward
him. American congressmen began to question the wisdom of se ll ing  so
much sophisticated weaponry to a regime that depended e n t ire ly  on one
man; Washington insiders began to re fe r  to the regime as a "one-bullet"
state. A fte r  hearing evidence presented by Amnesty International and
the International Commission of J u r is ts ,  the Chairman of the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on International Organization declared that
the Shah's regime could not be considered stable u n t i l  i t  permitted
"popular inpu t,"  created proper parliamentary structures, and allowed
133freedom o f the press, discussion and assembly.
In his statement before the Subcommittee on International Organiza­
t ion  concerning human r ights  in Iran, William J. Butler, a member of the 
International Commission of Ju r is ts ,  made the following recommendation 
to the Iranian government:
The in s t i tu t io n  of one-party p o l i t ic a l  system in Iran should 
cease, because, in e f fe c t ,  i t  deprives the r ig h t  of Iranians to 
choose th e ir  government fre e ly .  We also recommend tha t the govern­
ment transfe r back to the c iv i l  court the ju r is d ic t io n  o f m i l i ta ry  
tr ibuna ls  over c iv i l ia n s ,  and to remove from the SAVAK the r igh t 
to act as Iranian magistrates, thereby protecting the Iranian 
c it izens at the time o f arrest. We recommend the encouragement of 
greater freedom o f c r i t ic is m  and comment in the press and other 
media. We recommend tha t Iranian Government grant a general amnesty 
to those arrested, ind icted, or sentenced fo r  expressing c r i t ic is m  
of Iranian Government or i t s  po lic ies as distinguished from those 
who have inc ited  or committed acts of v io lence .>34
The impact o f the Carter human rights policy on the Shah and
Congress's d issa tis fac tion  of the Shah's regime were great. I t  made the
Shah aware o f  and made him face the re a l i ty  o f the c r is is  in his country.
The American government and Congress in d ire c t ly  implied to the Shah that
there was hope in solving the c r is is  in Iran. They wanted him to focus
on the center o f the c r is is  which was the human-rights condition and
p o l i t ic a l  l ib e ra l iz a t io n .  Yet, the Shah s t i l l  blamed America fo r  his
downfall. He said tha t Washington forced him to become too so f t ,  and
135thus, encouraged the upheaval.
The Shah was worried » a f te r  his return from the United States. He 
was not worried about the demonstrations or the in s ta b i l i t y  in Iran (he 
went through a s im ila r  c r is is  in 1953), but was worried that his 
American friends were not pleased with his regime. Thus, he wanted to 
sa t is fy  the new administration in  Washington. The Shah had a number of 
reasons fo r  responding p os it ive ly  to external pressures. He did not 
want to jeopardize his "special re la tions" w ith Washington and his 
access to American arms. He was re luctant to lose the image o f a 
forward-looking modernizer eager to bring the advantages of western 
c iv i l iz a t io n  to Iran--an image he had cu lt iva ted  at great expense in 
Europe and America. Moreover, he was convinced that his reforms were 
so popular that he could relax controls without endangering the whole 
regime; a decade of propaganda had managed to fool the ru le r  i f  not the 
ru le d .136
Because o f in ternal and external pressures, the Shah wanted to show 
a new f l e x ib i l i t y .  A fte r  his return from America, the Shah made a 
number o f promises of l ib e ra l iz a t io n ,  notably, free elections with a
j
varie ty  of p o l i t ic a l  parties to occur the following year. In February 
1978, the regime offered amnesty to 347 p o l i t ic a l  prisoners. In March, 
i t  allowed the International Commission o f the Red Cross to v i s i t  
twenty prisons and see more than 4,000 prison inmates. In A p r i l ,  i t  
permitted foreign lawyers to observe the t r i a l  of eleven dissidents 
accused o f terrorism; th is  was the f i r s t  time since the early 1960s that 
outside lawyers had been allowed in to a m i l i ta ry  tr ibuna l.  In early May, 
the Shah gave a private audience to a representative of Amnesty Interna­
tional and promised to improve prison conditions. In la te May, he gave
77
a si m ilar audience to a representative of the International Commission of
Ju r is ts . In early June, the Shah dismissed Hoveida, who had headed the
government fo r  the previous twelve years, and gave the premiership t o 1̂
137Jamshid Amouzegar, an American educated technocrat.
This time (1977-1978) fo r  the westernized and l ib e ra l Iranians., was 
a period o f euphoria. These groups believed that the l ib e ra l pressures *  
v/^and mass protests had sufficed to s ta r t  the regime on a path o f true 
l ib e ra l iz a t io n  from which . i t  could not turn back, given the threat o f 
renewed s tree t action and external pressure, i f  i t  did.
I t  may be in te resting  to mention that throughout 1978 most o f the 
westernized and l ib e ra l groups misjudged the s itu a t io n ; f i r s t ,  by 
thinking that the revolution would allow them a s ig n if ica n t postrevolu­
tionary ro le. But in July 1979, there was proof that they had almost 
un iversa lly miscalculated the s itua tion .
The development of the Iranian s itua tion  surprised both the Shah 
and the Carter Administration. Carter's human r ights  and the Shah's 
* M1 ibe ra l iza tion "  increased the peoples' expectations and raised the
number o f s tree t demonstrations. With l ib e ra l iz a t io n ,  the Shah improved 
only his image. His s l ig h t  l ib e ra l iz a t io n  encouraged the opposition to 
raise i t s  voice pub lic ly . The p o l i t ic a l  groups requested a serious 
l ib e ra l iz a t io n  from the Shah. These groups specified th e ir  demands in 
a new open le t te r  to the Shah:
The only way to restore the national unity and individual 
r igh ts  is to abandon despotism, respect the constitu tiona l 
laws, observe the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, abolish 
the one-party system, permit the freedom of press and assembly, 
release p o l i t ic a l  prisoners, allow exiles to return home, and 
establish a government tha t enjoyed public confidence and 
respected the fundamental l a w s . 138
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Until the Shah's promises of l ib e ra l iz a t io n  in November 1977 (a fte r  
his return from the United States), the opposition focused i t s  energies 
on underground a c t iv i t ie s .  But a fte r  the Shah's l ib e ra l iz a t io n ,  the 
l/ 'oppos it ion  overflowed in to the streets in a larger demonstration. The 
Shah fa i led  e ithe r to win over or subdue the growing opposition repre­
sented by massive peaceful demonstrations in several c i t ie s ,  with 
probably over a m il l io n  people in Tehran.
To deal with the opposition and th e ir  massive demonstrations, the 
regime adopted a new three p i l l a r  stra tegy. F i rs t ,  i t  t r ie d  to in t im i-  
$ d a te  physically the leaders o f the secular opposition. Creating an 
underground Committee of Revenge, SAVAK sent threatening le t te rs  to the 
lawyers and write rs  who were prominent in the human-rights movement.
In some cases, th is  underground committee kidnapped and beat up some 
members o f the Writers' Association, and also bombed the o ff ices of the 
p o l i t ic a l  parties which opposed the government. Second, the regime 
(^changed some of i t s  po lic ies aimed at con tro ll ing  the bazaar merchants 
and the moderate clergy. I t  called o f f  the a n t i - in f la t io n  war against 
small businessmen, dissolved the notorious "inspectorate teams," 
offered amnesty to shopkeepers imprisoned fo r  p ro f ite e r in g , ended plans 
fo r  establishing grand state-owned markets and permitted the Tehran 
bazaar to form a society o f merchants. Third, the new Prime Minister 
(JyAmouzegar t r ie d  to slow down the- r ise  in  the cost of l iv in g  by slowing 
down the economy. Unable to persuade the Shah to reduce the m il i ta ry  
budget, the Premier d ra s t ic a l ly  cut c iv i l ia n  expenditures, especially 
the development plan.
Surpris ingly, th is  new government strategy seemed to work. A good 
ind ication was the quietness o f the streets in the summer of 1978. The 
summer quiet turned out to be the l u l l  before the f in a l storm. The 
c r is is  had only ju s t  begun.
The Division Within the Carter Administration
The rapid development of the c r is is  in Iran and the change in 
American foreign policy confused the Shah. He said, " I  can recall
nothing in the h is tory  o f the world--not even the French Revolution--to
139compare with what happened subsequently." The Shah's source of 
confusion was from the peculiar pattern o f the revolution i t s e l f .  Each 
wave of r io t in g  was followed by a period o f calm, encouraging Tehran 
and Washington, in th e ir  wishful th ink ing, that the movement was simply 
running i t s  course before dying out.
Even though Carter o f f i c ia l l y  supported the monarchy in Iran, the 
Shah feared Carter's human-rights po licy. Also, he d id n 't  seem to 
understand the American strategy. The Shah had no clear ind ication of 
'the United States' in tentions. The consistent message that arrived from 
Washington was the human-rights sermon, along with expression o f support 
from the Pentagon and State Department representatives fo r  Iran. The 
Shah's course o f action seemed clear--attempt to meet the human rights 
demands. In tha t way, he would sa t is fy  the Americans, avoid the open 
c o n f l ic t  that might jeopardize his son's chances fo r  a peaceful and 
durable reign, and ensure tha t he would not be remembered as the man who 
had unleased a bloodbath on his country in his dying d a y s .^ 0
For the f i r s t  time in his p o l i t ic a l  career, the Shah saw himself 
alone and unable to solve the c r is is  in  his country. The death of the
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Minister o f Court Assadollah Ailam (the Shah's loyal fr iend) in 1978
increased the'_Shah_'-s is o la t ion., which was i t s e l f  one of the reasons fo r
the success of the revolution one year la te r .  One charac te r is t ic  o f the
Shah's behavior in th is  period was his d is tru s t  of the people around him,
including the Prime M inister. The Shah, therefore, sought out the
B r it ish  and the American ambassadors fo r  help:
The Shah has asked our ambassador and the one from Great 
B r ita in  to give him advice on how to handle the trend toward 
democracy and a more 1iberalized society. The Shah has moved 
very rapid ly and has alienated a lo t  o f powerful groups, 
p a r t ic u la r ly  the right-wing re lig ious leaders who don 't want 
any changes made in the old ways of doing things J41
As the revolution approached, the Shah's nervousness about the American 
administration 's intentions was matched by the opposition's hopefulness.
Carter's Administration was slow to recognize the Iranian c r is is .
The White House did not seem to understand the seriousness of the s itua ­
tion  u n t i l  November 1978, a f te r  months o f r io ts  and demonstrations in 
Iran. Although the administration c r i t ic iz e d  Iran 's human r igh ts  condi­
t ions , they offered the Shah no other a l te rn a t ive . Both the Shah and 
the American administration exaggerated th e ir  expectations o f each other.
In the beginning o f  Fall 1978, the Iranian c r is is  reached i t s  peak. 
The American administration fa i le d  to recognize the seriousness of i t .  
Even at the height o f the c r is is ,  President Carter had a hard time 
recognizing the stakes in Iran. The President and his s ta f f  were deeply 
involved in  other "important" matters: Camp David and i t s  fo llow-up,
.normalization with the People's Republic o f China, and Salt I I .
The Shah was very op tim is tic . He deeply believed that America 
would help him to solve th is  c r is is ;  thus he was waiting. He was con­
vinced tha t the American government had a grant strategy fo r  Iran, even
though i t s  outlines remained obscure to him. He was certa in  o f the 
existence o f an American strategy, fo r  the geopolit ica l stakes in the 
Iranian c r is is  were so great that i t  was inconceivable to him that the 
United States had not developed such a plan. So the Shah was waiting 
fo r  the American's grand design to solve his problem. He believed that 
i f  the Americans wanted him to remain, they were ce rta in ly  powerful
enough to support him, ju s t  as they had done during the Mossadeq ^
■ . 142c r is is .
The Americans, on the other hand, did not know that the Shah was 
dying from cancer. They also were slow to realize that his regime was 
im perilled. They considered the Shah as a professional w arrio r, able 
to survive th is  c r is is  as he had survived other crises before. There­
fore, Carter thought that the Shah was better qua lif ied  than any 
American to judge and deal with his country's domestic uprising. Given 
the amount o f power centralized in his hands and the l im ited  capab ility  
fo r  the United States, i t  was hard to see any other option. Carter did 
not believe in d irec t involvement in Iran. I t  was hard fo r  some of the 
Carter people to believe tha t a leader such as the Shah, who had been on 
the throne thirty-seven years, and who had weathered many cr ises, could 
not manage th is  c r is is .  Also, they tended to believe in the Shah's 
leadership fo r  the following reasons:
He had created the Iranian government v i r tu a l ly  s ingle- 
handedly, possessed great wealth, excellent in ternational 
connections, and the best-equipped, best-tra ined, most loyal 
army in the region. For years he had given Washington lectures 
on how to conduct po licy. The man charged with the responsib il­
i t y  o f protecting the entire  region should surely be able to 
maintain his own regime on an even k e e lJ 43
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Most o f the experts on the Iranian c r is is  now agree that during thev'"
la s t eight months of his reign, the Shah was not functioning. The
country, p ra c t ic a l ly ,  had no leader capable o f evaluating the s itua tion  
and reacting accordingly. This was an even more serious defect because 
the royal d icta torsh ip had inured i ts  top o f f ic ia ls  in to taking no 
in i t ia t iv e  of th e ir  own, so that even at the most c r i t i c a l  moments, they 
would wait fo r  d irec tives , which were slow to arr ive .
There was continuous struggling and grouping going on in the 
American administration over the way that the administration should  ̂ '  
choose to deal with the Iranian c r is is .  For instance, there was sub­
s tan tia l disagreement between the State Department and the National 
Security Council. That disagreement was known as the "Vance-Brzezinski^ 
c o n f l ic t .
Secretary o f State Cyrus Vance sided with William Sullivan, the 
American Ambassador in Tehran. They believed that the old Kissingerian 
geopo lit ica l view o f the world had been abandoned in favor of a more
.^m ora lis tic  approach. Thus, they argued tha t the United States could not
give i t s  support, under th is  administration, to repression in Iran.
Brzezinski believed that the nature of the Shah's regime was a 
d is t in c t ly  secondary question, and that Iran was of such preeminent/"" 
importance to the American Middle East po licy that the Shah should be 
encouraged to do whatever was necessary to preserve control of the 
country.
James Schlesinger, the Energy Secretary and former Director o f the 
CIA, was involved in th is  scenario and sided with Brzezinski. ^
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Brzezinski and Schlesinger believed not only that Iran 's own 
s tra teg ic  importance must be taken in to  account, but that the Monarch's 
collapse would also make Iraq and other pro-Soviet elements stronger in 
the Persian Gulf. I f  these elements became stronger, they might threaten 
the Gulf (most o f America's western a l l ie s  and Japan depended on the 
Gulf's o i l ) ,  and the s ta b i l i t y  o f the region. Therefore, the destruction 
o f the Shah's regime might lead other Middle East monarchies to q u e s t io n .r^  
the value o f reliance on and a lliance with the United States. ' i f i
The other side o f the c r is is  w ith in  the Carter Administration was
the way which th jj jnA ^dea lt  with the Iranian c r is is .  The problem with
American inte lligence--which i t s e l f  was ju s t  a special case of the
American policymaking--was not tha t i t  fa i le d  to foresee the coming of
146the c r is is ,  but tha t i t  did not understand the c r is is  when i t  came.
Until la te  Fall 1978, top CIA o f f ic ia ls  in Washington and Tehran, 
mired in part by th e ir  l im ited Iranian contacts, re lied  on SAVAK andv/ 
Iranian o f f ic ia ls  fo r  th e ir  knowledge of the opposition in Iran. I t  was 
obvious that SAVAK did not want to explain the depth of the c r is is ,  
because SAVAK was working under the Shah's d irec t order, and as has been 
discussed, the Shah denied ( in  the early stage o f the c r is is )  the 
existence of the opposition.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held closed hearings on Iran 
on September 15, 1978. When they asked the CIA d irec to r and former 
embassy deputy ch ie f, why the government had fa i le d  to antic ipate the 
Iranian c r is is ,  both persons' answers were the same--because the CIA had 
re lied  heavily upon the Iranian SAVAK fo r  information!
c/The CIA did not take the Iranian c r is is  seriously at a l l .  Through­
out most o f the c r is is  period, there were ju s t  two analysts working 
fu l l t im e  on Iran, and fo r  much of that period, there was only one in d i­
vidual following and analyzing events at the agency. For the most part, 
the CIA analysts who dealt w ith Iranian material were not Persian 
specia lis ts  at a l l ,  but rather Arabists. Even in December 1978, when 
the CIA organized a special task force to fo llow the Iranian revolution, 
the head of the task force was from an Arab state b r a n c h .^
In late 1978, Carter was worried about the development of the 
Iranian C ris is . He was surprised at the inaccuracy o f the in te ll igence  
evaluation. Given the rea liza tion  that valuable time had been lo s t ,
Carter blamed the in te ll igence  service fo r  not warning him e a r l ie r  about 
the seriousness o f the c r is is .  "On November 11, the President declared
The President, also, was d issa tis f ied  with Su ll ivan 's  performance 
as an American ambassador in tha t c r i t i c a l  time. The main cause of the 
disagreement between the President and his ambassador in Tehran was 
tha t/Su llivan  disagreed with American support of the Shah. Sullivan 
had become convinced tha t opposition leaders had gained a much stronger 
voice in Iran 's a f fa i r s ,  and thus, American should deal with them, not 
with the Shah. To do tha t, the ambassador insisted tha t the Shah 
should leave Iran immediately. The President rejected Su llivan 's  
recommendation. The reason fo r  Carter's re jection  was because he
believed that the Shah, his new Prime M inister (Shahpur Bakhtiar), and 
the Iranian m il i ta ry  leaders needed Arnerican support, especia lly , at
himself not sa t is f ie d  with th e ir  performance on Iran ." 148
th is  crucial time. 149
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The c o n f l ic t  between Carter and Sullivan reached i t s  peak when
Sullivan asked the President, fo r  the second time, i f  he could go
d ire c t ly  to Khomeini in Paris to evolve some working arrangement with
him. But the President, fo r  the previous reasons, rejected Su llivan 's
recommendation fo r  the second time. The President did not want to be
d ire c t ly  involved with Khomeini. Instead, the President thought to ask
the French President (Carter met with French and B r it ish  leaders at a
Guadeloupe conference on January 4, 1979) to  mediate. This request
made Ambassador Sullivan very angry. The President described Sullivan
as i l lo g ic a l .  Carter said that Sullivan, "apparently los t control of
himself. Sullivan used such phrases as 'gross and perhaps ir re tr ie va b le
150mistake,' 'plan o f sn a ity , ' and incomprehensible.'"
The President wanted to f i r e  Sullivan from his job, but la te r ,  
because o f Secretary Vance's interference, Carter knew that i t  would be 
a mistake to put a new man in Iran in the midst of the c r is is .  For 
Carter, Sullivan was unable to present an objective analysis o f the 
complicated s itua tion  in Iran. Sullivan, also, was unable to provide 
the Administration with adequate reports about the m i l i ta ry .
Sullivan was not the only one who had caused trouble fo r the 
President. There had been a group o f o f f ic ia ls  in the State Department 
who opposed Carter's judgment and sided with Sullivan. To solve the 
problem once and fo r  a l l ,  the President met with most o f the State 
Department o f f ic ia ls  and to ld  them i f  they could not support what he 
decided, they might lose th e ir  jobs:
. . . i f  there was another outbreak of misinformation, 
d is to r t io n s , or se lf-serv ing news leaks, I would d irec t the 
Secretary o f State to discharge the o f f ic ia ls  responsible
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fo r  that p a rt icu la r  desk, even i f  some innocent people might 
be punished. I simply could not l ive  with th is  s i tu t io n  any 
longer, and repeated that they would have to be loyal to me 
or to res ign.151
What added to the complexity o f the s itua tion  at th is  time was the 
Soviets' sudden warning. President Brezhnev warned the United Statec
not to in te rfe re  in the in ternal a f fa irs  of Iran. He said tha t the 
U.S.S.R. could not stand fo r  any m il i ta ry  intervention to preserve the 
Shah in power. Carter responded to the Soviet threat by saying that 
the United States had no in tention of becoming involved. He said, "I
A fte r  solving the c o n f l ic t  in his administration, Carter refocused 
on the Iranian c r is is  again. Carter assigned George Ball and General 
Robert Huyser to two d i f fe re n t assignments. Mr. Ball was the former 
Undersecretary of State in the Kennedy Administration. Carter asked him 
to consult w ith the National Security Council in assessing what the 
United States could do about the troubles in Iran. Ball recommended that 
the United States encourage the Shah toward a broadly based c iv i l ia n  
government, one in which he would surrender most of his power to  a 
regency council. B a ll 's  recommendation was s im ila r  to the one of the 
National Front, which was rejected by the Shah e a r l ie r .  The Carter 
Administration d id n 't  take B a ll 's  recommendation in to  consideration 
because i t  f e l t  that i t  s t i l l  did not know the opposition very w e ll,  
and thus, they could not t ru s t  i t .  Instead, Carter wanted to support— - 
Prime M in is ter Shahpour Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar, on the other hand, needed 
the m il i ta ry  support in order to function. For that reason, Carter sent
153
General [^uyser to Iran to advise the Iranian generals to back up Bakhtiar.
le t  him know that we would not in te r fe re , but that we would honor o u r ^
IS?commitments to Iran and that we f u l l y  supported the Shah."
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Bakhtiar was a sixty-two-year old scion of the powerful Bakhtiari
t r ib e ,  a Sorbonne graduate, and a deputy m inister in Mossadeq government.'
He demonstrated surpris ing strength and independence. He called fo r
press freedom, the release o f a l l  p o l i t ic a l  prisoners and the dissolution^.
of SAVAK. While he waited fo r  the Shah's departure, Bakhtiar also
defended the importance o f a smooth and legitimate t ra n s it io n . He said,
" I f  the Shah f e l l  now, the m il i ta ry  would s p l i t  in to  several factions,
154coup would fo llow  coup and Iran would d r i f t  in to  chaos or c iv i l  war.
For both Carter and Bakhtiar, i t  seemed obvious that the only solu­
t ion  fo r  the c r is is  was to have a united m il i ta ry  in Iran . That would 
only be possible by sending an American general who knew the Iranian 
m il i ta ry  leaders in person. The respons ib il i ty  o f th is  person would be 
to strengthen the resolve of the m il i ta ry  leaders, and "encourage them
to remain in Iran in order to maintain s ta b i l i t y ,  even i f  the Shah
155should decide to leave."
As has been mentioned, Carter sent General Huyser on that assignment. 
Before his new assignment, Huyser was Deputy Commander of the United 
States forces in Europe.
By the a rr iva l o f General Huyser in Tehran, President Carter 
announced his f u l l  support o f Prime Minister Bakhtiar's e f fo r ts  to forrrj^ 
a new government. Huyser immediately began ta lk ing  to the ranking 
o f f ic e rs ,  looking fo r  solutions fo r  the c r is is .  But, from the Iranian 
viewpoint, "the Huyser mission was the f i r s t  public ind ication tha t the
United States was more than an interested observer o f the current
*  ..155events.
88
The Final Attempt
Huyser's.arrival in Tehran gave the Soviets a good propaganda oppor­
tun ity  to attack the American foreign policy in the region. Typ ica lly , 
the Soviets did not l ik e  to see an American general in a neighboring 
country. The Soviets were nervous about the American interference in 
Iran because of th e ir  1500-mile border with Iran. I t  was hard fo r  t l ^  
Soviets to believe that Huyser's mission was ju s t  a p o l i t ic a l  one (or 
that he was there fo r  maintaining unity among the Iranian armed forces). 
The Soviets seemed to be convinced that the real mission o f th is  AmericanX' 
general was to take over by some kind o f coup. Ovchinnikov said,
" . . . in fo rm a tion  is f i l t e r in g  in to  the press to the e ffec t 
tha t, at the meeting with the Iranian generals, Huyser is also 
discussing plans fo r  a Chilean-type m il i ta ry  coup.. .General 
Huyser is serving as the coordinator o f U.S. actions that are 
aimed at maintaining the present regime or a t creating a new, 
but equally pro-American regime. In that l ig h t ,  the statement 
by U.S. o f f ic ia ls  about 'noninterference' in Iran 's  a f fa irs  
looks less than convincing."157
Two weeks a f te r  his a r r iv a l ,  Huyser realized how complicated was 
his mission in Iran. He was faced with two problems. F i rs t ,  he - 
realized that there were major differences in the way he perceived the 
s itua tion  and the way Ambassador Sullivan did. Second, the General was 
te r r ib ly  confused by the speed of the development of the c r is is  in Iran.
As was mentioned, Huyser's job was to ensure that the m il i ta ry  in 
Iran remained loyal to Bakhtiar and that i t  contributed to a smooth 
t ra n s it io n  to whatever broadly based opposition regime f in a l ly  came to 
power. He was also to assess the general morale o f m i l i ta ry  leaders 
in Iran and t r y  to unite them. According to Soviet sources, Huyser's 
mission was also to hold the armed forces together fo r  possibly m i l i ta ry  
action, such as a m i l i ta ry  coup.
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Sull ivan 's  views ce rta in ly  were contradicting Huyser’ s. The 
Ambassador was well aware o f the c r is is .  He knew the Iranian p o l i t ic a l  
figures personally. He was also well aware o f the psychological strength 
of the m il i ta ry  leaders. In the beginning of January 1979, Sullivan was 
convinced that Iran 's p o l i t ic a l  structures were breaking apart, and that 
the m il i ta ry  leaders would not support Bakhtiar. For a l l  these reasons, 
Sullivan stuck to his views, repeated what he said before, and advised 
Carter to deal with Khomeini and the opposition d ire c t ly .
S u l l ivan advised the administration not to oppose Khomeini's take­
over because his rule might lead to democracy, while Huyser thought i t  
would lead to catastrophe and chaos. Sullivan believed that the 
m il i ta ry  should stay neutral. Huyser believed the opposite and thought 
that the m il i ta ry  should support Bakhtiar u n t i l  a new constitu t ion  could 
be w rit ten  and put in to  e ffe c t.  The h istory showed that Su ll ivan 's  view
of the Iranian c r is is  was much more r e a l is t ic  than the one o f General
u 158Huyser.
Huyser was not a spec ia lis t on Iran and he did not speak the 
language. He advised the Iranian m il i ta ry  to remain united behind the 
Bakhtiar government. Unfortunately, his instructions contained no 
guidance on what to say i f  the government f e l l .  He did not have enough 
experience or knowledge about the s itua tion  in Iran to give advice 
about the continuing d is in tegra tion  of power in the m il i ta ry .  For most 
o f the Iranians, Huyser's mission was unknown. For the Shah, Huyser 
was a middle man between the m il i ta ry  and the p o l i t ic a l  co a li t io n  in
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The Shah, in his book Answer to H is to ry , wrote that he was aston­
ished when he learned in January .1979, that the U.S. A ir  Force general 
had been in Tehran fo r  several days. He added that he asked his generals 
about Huyser and his mission, but they knew nothing. The Shah believes 
that Huyser's mission was to "neutralize" the Iranian Army when demon­
strations became v io len t.
When Sullivan went to the Shah on January 3, 1979, to work out the 
de ta ils  o f his departure, Huyser went with him. I t  was at th is  meeting 
that the Shah f i r s t  learned of the general's presence in Iran.
Encouraged by Huyser and the U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan, the
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Shah went in to  ex ile  on January 16, 1979. General Amir Hussein Rabii, 
Commander in Chief o f  the Iranian A ir  Force, before his execution, 
questioned the role played by General Huyser. He replied to his judges, 
"General Huyser threw the emperor of the country l ik e  a dead mouse!
General Huyser was not fa m il ia r  with the nature of the Iranian c r is is .  
When he came to Iran, the c r is is  was at i t s  peak. Huyser had previously 
made several t r ip s  to Iran (before he was assigned to the mission), 
usually to discuss m il i ta ry  contingencies and to study the way in which 
Iranian and NATO forces would cooperate in the event of an international 
c r is is ,  but he had l i t t l e  knowledge of Iranian society, and did not speak 
Farsi. And, although Huyser had a f ine reputation as a m i l i ta ry  man, he 
had not demonstrated outstanding p o l i t ic a l  and diplomatic s k i l ls .
Huyser was probably not enthusiastic about the mission, but could 
not f a i l  to obey an order. His instruction  was somewhat vague, but the 
general d irec tion  was clear enough. I t  is  un like ly  that anyone could 
have performed th is  mission e ffe c t ive ly .
Huyser flew to Washington and reported d ire c t ly  to the President K  
that everything was going w e ll ,  tha t Bakhtiar had every chance of 
p reva il ing , that the m il i ta ry  was holding together, and that there was 
no need fo r  drastic  action. He did confirm that there was disorder in 
the s tree ts , but that the opposition understood that the f i r s t  step 
taken against e ithe r the government or the m il i ta ry  would lead to 
instant reaction by the troops.161
Both President Carter and Bakhtiar had great confidence in Huyser. 
They believed, along with the General, that the m il i ta ry  leaders were 
united, and loyal to Bakhtiar. The re a l i ty  was d i f fe re n t.  There was 
already considerable contrast between some o f the m il i ta ry  o f f ice rs  and 
the re lig ious leaders. These m il i ta ry  o ff ice rs  believed that th e ir  
chance fo r  survival would be bette r by going over to the revolution 
than by f igh t ing  fo r  a leader with a broken w i l l .  Thus, these groups ^  
o f  generals had made a f irm  agreement with the opposition. This group 
was headed by the Chief of S ta ff ,  General Gharabaghi, and the Court 
Inspector Hossein Fardoust. The Shah himself accused the two of 
betraying him. He explained his accusations by saying that a l l  the 
other m i l i ta ry  leaders had e ithe r  died o f fled Iran by early 1980, 
while Gharabaghi lived on in uncertain circumstances and Fardoust had 
become the Chief o f the new secret po lice , SAUAMA, which had replaced 
the old one, SAVAK.162
In te res ting ly  enough, General Fardoust was the Shah's closest 
fr iend fo r  almost fo r ty  years. Selected by the young Mohammad Reza, 
in 1940, to accompany him to school in Switzerland, Fardoust rose to 
the powerful position o f  Court Inspector, thus a tta in ing  considerable
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influence over and information about SAVAK and the armed forces. He 
attended many of the crucia l m il i ta ry  planning sessions and was often 
consulted by the generals and by Huyser, when a major decision had to 
be made. Today, many o f the survivors from the upper class of the 
Iranian m il i ta ry  establishment are convinced that Fardoust betrayed 
them, and they see his present position as confirmation o f his treachery.
When the Shah le f t  Iran on January 16, 1979, he believed that h is)^ 
departure would be a temporary one. He thought tha t things would become 
so bad in Iran that the people would ca ll him back. But, th is  was not 
1953, and the Shah was wrong in  thinking that h is tory would repeat i t s e l f .
To strengthen the Bakhtiar government, President Carter, fo r  t h g ^  
f i r s t  time, sent Ayatollah Khomeini a message. In his message, the 
President encouraged the Ayatollah to support Bakhtiar and to give him 
a chance. Carter added tha t i t  was in everyone's in te res t to avoid an 
explosion and fu rth e r  bloodshed. Ayatollah Khomeini replied that the 
Americans should not support Bakhtiar. The Ayatollah declared that i f .  
America stayed out o f the Iranian c r is is ,  Iran, in  the fu ture , would 
become a re l iab le  o i l  supplier to the West. Khomeini added that Iran 
might have a fr ie n d ly  re la tionsh ip  with the United States in the fu ture , 
" i f  the United States behaves co rrec tly , does not in te rfe re  in our 
a f fa irs  and withdraws the advisors who are intervening in  our country,
I  C O
we w i l l  respect i t  in re tu rn ."
Bakhtiar t r ie d  to carry out his own negotiations with Khomeini.
F irs t ,  he sent a member o f the government to negotiate with Khomeini.
When th is  fa i le d ,  Bakhtiar t r ie d  himself to meet with Khomeini, but the 
Ayatollah refused to meet him. He would accept him only i f  the Prime
Minister resigned. Bakhtiar refused to resign, but he said that the 
Ayatollah was welcome to come back home.
A fte r  f i f te e n  years o f ex i le ,  Ayatollah Khomeini f in a l ly  re tu rned^
l fidto Iran, on February 2, 1979.
I f  Bakhtiar held o f f ice , Khomeini held the power. The Ayatollah
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wasted no time announcing he would not negotiate with Bakhtiar. Instead 
y / th e  Ayatollah declared Bazargan, the true Prime M in ister. Bakhtiar 
fought back.
Bakhtiar was sure o f m i l i ta ry  support because Gharabaghi promised 
to support him. Gharabaghi secretly negotiated with the revolutionary 
force because he was a fra id  fo r  his own l i f e  and in te res ts , but he also 
lo s t control over his o f f ice rs . The armed forces, despite th e ir  large 
numbers and ultrasophisticated weapons, were traumatized by having to ^ , 
go out in to  the streets day in and day out to shoot down unarmed fellow 
c it izens shouting re lig ious slogans. The armed forces had to , fo r  the 
f i r s t  time, f ig h t  face-to-face with the g u e rr i l la s .
The g u e rr i l la  forces pi aved an important role in destroying what 
was l e f t  o f the Shah's Imperial Guard. In the la s t days o f the Bakhtiar 
government, the g u e rr i l la  organizations and Tudeh Party delivered to the 
regime i t s  coup-de-grace.
The f in a l drama began in  Tehran on the evening of Friday, February 9 
when the Imperial Guard t r ie d  to crush a mutiny among a i r  force techni­
cians and cadets at a large m il i ta ry  base. As soon as the f igh t ing  
started, the g u e rr i l la  organizations rushed to help the besieged cadets. 
A fte r  a while , the Imperial Guard withdrew. The gue rr i l la s  went to the 
base and d is tr ibu ted  arms to the local population, and set up stree t
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barricades. Early the next morning, the g u e rr i l la s  and the a i r  force
cadets drove a load o f weapons to Tehran University. The same day they
took over the main arms factory and most o f the police stations. The
same thing happened in most a l l  Iranian c i t ie s .  At 2:00 pm, Gharabaghi,
the Chief of General S ta ff ,  announced that the m il i ta ry  would take no
sides in the struggle between Bakhtiar and the revolutionary forces.
F ina lly , on February 11, Bakhtiar announced his resignation along with
the surrender o f the armed forces. These three days o f intense f igh t ing
had brought the Islamic revolution to an end and the 2,500-year monarchy
165to u t te r  destruction.
Once the Ayatollah had come in to power, the Carter Administration 
adopted, what was f e l t  was a moderate and cooperative course o f action 
toward the new regime, maintaining food sales and supplying spare parts 
fo r  m i l i ta ry  equipment. There are those who fa u l t  th is  po licy , not only 
with the t ra d i t io n a l is t  argument that the U.S. was kowtowing to rebels, 
but also'on the ground that the Americans did not understand Iranian 
society. Others argued that the administration f e l t  the U.S. had good 
reasons—including the fa m il ia r  s tra teg ic  and economic ones--to develop 
f r ie nd ly  re la tions with the new Iranian regime.
Perhaps the t r ic k ie s t  question about U.S. policy was whether or not 
the American administration should have allowed the Shah to come to
X
New York, the act that brought about the seizure of the American Embassy. 
That was a serious Carter mistake. That decision reinforced Iranians' 
fear tha t the U.S. planned to restore the Shah to power, as i t  had in 
1953.
Many people analyzed the reasons fo r  the Shah's downfall and i t s  
re la tionship with the Carter Administration. Each group saw the cause
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from a d if fe re n t angle. Therefore, they ended up with d i f fe re n t conclu­
sions. The conclusions can be categorized in to  J ive d if fe re n t  groups:
a. The Shah's enemies included l e f t i s t  forces headed by the Tudeh 
Party, the National Front, m inorit ies and re lig ious opposition.
The Tudeh Party had opposed the Pahlavi dynasty since 1935. This
party was contro lled by the Russians since i t s  creation. The reason why
Tudeh survived a l l  these years was because i t  changed according to the
times and to the s itua t ion . Tudeh was l ik e  a laboratory fo r  Soviet
tac tics  and strategy in the whole region. To f i t  with the Iranian
s itua t io n , th is  Marxist-Leninist party accepted the basic princ ip les 
166of Islam. The National Front was seen as a one-time pro-Mossadeq 
organization which held power from the Shah in 1953. The central policy 
of the Front was focused on attacking the Shah's authoritarianism, the 
abuses of power by the SAVAK, and the corruption o f the system as a 
whole. The re lig ious opposition (led by the exiled Ayatollah Rouhollah 
Khomeini), on the other hand, had not only opposed the Shah's moderniza­
tion  program, but communism as we ll. A l l these segments of opposition 
made a common cause in res is t ing  the Shah, and in 1979, they put a l l  
th e ir  differences away and destroyed the Shah's regime. A fte r the 
success o f  the revolution, the le f t i s t s  and the na tiona lis ts  were 
expelled from power because o f the domination of re lig ious groups.
b. The ro y a l is t  group (including the Shah h imself) blamed the 
Shah's downfall on a conspiracy, h inting that American o i l  companies 
aimed to use the Shah in a scheme to raise petroleum prices. They 
claimed that Khomeini was too uneducated to plan a revolution such as 
the Iranian revolution. Without CIA planning, they thought the success 
of the revolution was impossible!
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c. Henry Kissinger saw the Shah's downfall as an example o f the 
weakness o f the American foreign policy and clumsy tac t ica l handling of 
the c r is is  by Carter and his administration. Kissinger said,
"The Shah did not res is t  the opposition more fo rce fu l ly  
because he must have had doubts about our real in ten tions.
The libeT^lizatiori'Ttrate^gy, forced on the~Shah by Washington, 
was mistaken since an ongoing revolution cannot be moderated
by concession. These can come only when order is restored.
Whether we l ik e  i t  or not, the Shah was considered our close
a l ly  in that area fo r  37 years.167
d. George Ball blamed Nixon and Kissinger fo r  the downfall o f the 
Iranian regime. He said, "Building up the Shah as a regional power and 
disastrous encouragement to the Shah to overload his country with
^  inappropriate m i l i ta ry  hardware, were the causes fo r  f inancia l c r is is ,  
unemployment, d isa ffec ta t ion , and an encouragement of the Shah's 
megalomania."^ Ball disagreed with Kissinger's analysis and mentioned 
tha t the reason fo r  the Shah's f a l l  was not because of the Carter Admin­
is t ra t io n ,  but because a l l  Iran was against the Shah and also because
169of his army's d is in tegra tion .
e. F ina lly , Zbigniews Brzezinski's analysis, which is presented in 
his Power and Princ ip le  (1983). Brzezinski was very careful throughout 
his book not to take any respons ib il i ty  fo r  the downfall of the Iranian 
regime (He was the National Security Adviser fo r  President Carter). He 
blamed the Shah and American policy in  Iran fo r  the 1979 downfall. 
Describing the reasons o f the downfall Brzezinski said,
" . . . r a p id  modernization o f a very tra d it io n a l society ^  
breeds i t s  own in s ta b i l i t ie s  and revolutionary dynamics, 
that i t  requires a p o l i t ic a l  system that can gradually enlarge 
p o l i t ic a l  pa rt ic ipa t ion  while providing safety valves fo r  
social d issa t is fac t ion , that old re lig ious be lie fs  should not 
be uprooted without gradual public acceptance o f more modern 
values, including some genuine connection with the national
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past. The.Shah's regime vio lated these basic ru les, and U.S. 
po lic ies throughout the seventies, including our own four years, 
could not and did not provide e ffec t ive  r e m e d i e s . "170
While the real reason behind the Shah's downfall w i l l  remain unknown, 
one thing is  certa in , and that is that the success of the Iranian revolu­
tion  in 1979 destroyed the Shah's regime and with i t  the American 
influence in Iran.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
From the beginning o f World War I I  u n t i l  1952, the United States 
had no serious intentions of becoming involved in Iran. The focus of 
American foreign policy was concentrated on the recovery of Europe 
through the Marshall Plan. American support fo r  Iran during th is  period 
(1943-1952) was aimed at helping Iran in gaining i t s  t e r r i t o r ia l  in teg­
r i t y  and improving i t s  economic s itua t ion . This thesis attempted to 
describe the nature and the objective o f American s tra teg ic  po licy in 
the period between 1943 and 1979. The thesis t r ie d  to pinpoint the 
sh if ts  in American foreign policy and to indicate th e ir  e f fec t on the 
Iranian domestic p o l i t ic a l  development.
America's serious involvement in Iran started in 1953. This sudden 
s h i f t  in American foreign po licy away from non-involvement occurred as 
a resu lt  o f  the following circumstances:
1. In the early 1950s, America recognized the s tra teg ic  importance 
of Iran in the Persian Gulf. Iran 's  unique location in the Gulf and i t s  
large reserve of o i l  a ttracted the a ttention of American o i l  companies 
more than ever before.
2. Mossadeq's nationa liza tion  of the Anglo-Iraniah Oil Company 
sh ifted  American a ttention toward Iran. The nationa liza tion  was a 
serious threat to a l l  the western interests throughout the Middle East.
3. The Cold War and the struggle between the two superpowers in 
Europe and the Third World increased the importance of Iran (because of 
i t s  s tra teg ic  location) in the Gulf region.
4. American policy in th is  period was mostly anti-communist.
Because the Shah feared the communist and n a t io n a lis t  movements throughout
the Middle East, he t ied  his regime with the United States. Because both 
the Shah and the United States had a common enemy, they worked closely 
to bu ild  a strong a lliance. I t  was fo r  the reasons above that the United 
States involved i t s e l f  in Iran more than ever before. The American- 
Iranian a lliance shaped i t s e l f  a f te r  the overthrow of Mossadeq, and the 
United States started i t s  technical cooperation and arms sale to Iran 
soon afterwards.
The Shah's objective in Ir is plan fo r  modernizing Iran was to serve 
his own and America's in te rests . The Shah1 s goal was to transform Iran 
from a Third World country in to  a strongly industr ia l ized  pro-western 
country. He succeeded in establishing his absolute rule in Iran by 
cent r a l i z in g power as much as possible. He also succeeded in increasing 
Iran 's  control over o i l  production and p r ic ing, and b u i l t  up a large 
m il i ta ry  power in the Persian Gulf region. The Shah was attempting to 
create a modern m il i ta ry  establishment in a country that lacked the 
technical, educational and indus tr ia l base to provide the necessary 
trained personnel and managerial capab il i t ies  to operate such an estab­
lishment e ffe c t ive ly .  To reach his goal in modernizing the m i l i ta ry ,  
the Shah spent nearly one fourth o f the to ta l Iranian budget fo r  defense 
ending every year. As a re s u lt ,  the Shah's overall po lic ies  of 
accelerated indus tr ia l and m il i ta ry  buildup soon proved to be beyond 
ctn's capacity.
The Shah's plan to modernize or change Iran was weak and f u l l  of 
contradictions. The Shah's po lic ies  (economic and socia l) fa i le d  to 
achieve th e ir  own projected objectives. They were overambitious, mis­
managed, badly coordinated, and poorly planned. The Shah's plans were
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counterproductive in re la tion  to Iran 's means and needs. The rapid 
^ in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n  raised the people's expectations in Iran and increased^
! th e i r  f ru s tra t io n  toward the regime. The Shah was unable to meet the
people's demands.
One source o f the Shah's d i f f i c u l t y  and in a b i l i t y  originated from 
I his frus tra t io n  and the lack of understanding of the American system.
This problem widened the gap between him and his American friends in 
Washington. The Shah did not understand the sloppy and uneven process 
| that characterized a democratic society. Baffled by the presence of so 
many centers o f real and potential power, confused by the constant out­
pouring of discordant views, frus tra ted  by the slow march o f leg is la t io n  
j and even executive decision making, the Shah inev itab ly  conjured up an 
unseen log ic  behind the chaotic appearance of events. Since the Shah 
made f u l l  use of a l l  instruments o f power in maintaining his own position 
 ̂ and advancing the in terests o f "h is" country, he presumed that the United 
States did likewise. Since he dealt with domestic opponents in summary 
fashion, he found i t  hard to believe tha t the American President could 
not always prevail on matters that the Shah believed imoortant.
\ The majority o f the Iranian people saw the Shah and his regime a s .X ^
a threat to th e i r  values and t ra d it io n s ,  and thus, they regarded the
Shah as a t r a i to r .  The Iranian people also f e l t  that th e ir  cu ltu ra l 
 ̂ id e n t ity  and tra d it io n a l yearning fo r freedom and ju s t ice  were seriously
x threatened. The Shah was the center o f the Iranian c r is is .  The p o l i t i -
: ~ ~  — —  .
cal unrest in Iran had i t s  roots in his fa i lu re  to permit the growth of 
responsible opposition to his own one-man ru le . His commendable e f fo r t  
to modernize by educating his people and ra ising th e ir  standard of
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l iv in g  was impaired from the s ta r t  by his^refusal to allow a greater 
measure o f  p o l i t ic a l  expression.
In the la te 1970s, more than any time in i t s  h is to ry , Iran had 
become the land of contrad iction, bewilderment, destruction, and d iver­
sion. Economically, i t  was a nation of "nouveaux r iches." Sociologically, 
i t  was a nation in confusion, i f  not madness; p o l i t i c a l l y ,  i t  was a nation 
of phobias--fear o f fa i lu re ,  fear o f SAVAK, and in g e n e ra l fe a r  of the 
future.
American support, especia lly in the la s t twenty-five years, fo r  the 
^Shah's d ic ta to rsh ip , was one o f the reasons behind the anti-American 
fee ling in Iran. The Iranians saw the Americans as using them fo r  th e ir  
own purposes, because of Iran 's  s tra teg ic  position. They saw themselves 
being used by the Americans as a gendarme of the region against Soviet 
or communist advance.
The Iranian people also blamed U.S. policy fo r  Iran 's  economic
<
c r is is  in the early 1970s. Large American sales of arms, agricu ltu ra l 
equipment, high technology, and consumer goods inadvertently helped 
destablize Iran 's  economy and contributed to the Iranian revolution.
The impact o f  the Carter Administration's stress on human r igh ts  had 
been p a rt icu la r ly  strong in  Iran. Both the Iranian government and 
Iranians in opposition to the government had responded to i t .  The 
government responded pos it ive ly  and started some l ib e ra l iz a t io n .  The 
opposition, on the other hand, was cautiously exploring the extent to 
whch the government was w i l l in g  to relax its , contro l. In the beginning 
of 1977, both the government and the opposition in Iran were testing the 
Carter human r ights  po licy. The opposition was expecting that the
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s itua t ion  might be changed to th e ir  advantage. The Shah was waiting fo r
Garter to unveil his grand design. Carter, on the other hand, was
^o n fused  w ith the contradictory advice which he got from the White House 
men. The c o n f l ic t  w ith in  the administration, the Vance-Brzezinski 
c o n f l ic t ,  was the reason fo r  Carter's misunderstanding o f the Iranian 
c r is is  in la te 1978. Carter's human r igh ts  attempt, the factionalism 
in his administration, and the Shah's l ib e ra l iz a t io n  helped the opposi­
t ion  in Iran to work more fre e ly  than ever before. Because of a combi­
nation of in ternal and external factors, the Shah's regime f e l l  in  1979.
The American programs (m il i ta ry  modernization, technical cooperation, 
ag ricu ltu ra l reforms) ignored the fact tha t the people in Iran were
predominantly rura l w ith  a wide gap between urban and country l i f e .  The
development projects in the c i t ie s  accelerated the urban d r i f t ,  drained 
o f f  from the rura l areas much o f the po te n tia l ly  talented human resources, 
and fu r th e r  accentuated the gap between rural and c i ty  l i f e .
Another important point which these programs fa i le d  to recognize 
was the tempo and the rhythm of l i f e  in the Third World. The l i f e  of 
people in the modern world is governed by the clock and the calendar.
The l i f e  o f people in the underdeveloped areas was very simple and 
p r im it ive . The re lig ious  feasts, the fas t in g , and the secular holidays 
in any o f the societies in the underdeveloped areas were usually deeply 
entrenched, were f u l l  o f meaning (both sentimental and re l ig io u s ) ,  and 
were a strong, in tegrating force fo r  the group. They conflic ted  with 
western concepts of e ff ic iency  and progress. The Americans hoped the 
people of Iran would adjust and conform to the tempo and rhythm o f the 
western world. The Americans also believed that the people in Iran
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were no d if fe re n t  than those in America and other western countries. 
Thus, they pushed Iran toward modernization in an American way.
To most Americans, "economic security ,"  means earning enough money 
to l iv e  comfortable and saving enough to l iv e  on in th e ir  old age. But, 
to the m il l ions  of people in Iran, economic security meant something 
much more immediate and urgent. I t  meant th e ir  da ily  bread--where the 
next meal was coming from. They needed American help desperately. They 
needed American help in learning how to produce more food and how to 
raise th e ir  standard o f l iv in g .  But did they rea l ly  receive that kind 
o f help, and did the American "Technical Cooperation" improve th e ir  
lives? The answer to these questions is  obvious. The American programs 
in Iran were not thought out very w e ll,  and suffered greatly from a lack 
o f  planning.
Effective projects should be planned on the basis of a people's 
ex is ting  social and economic conditions. Where the economy is  s t i l l  
la rgely  at the subsistence leve l, the emphasis should be placed f i r s t  
on smaller, consumer industries. Production of consumer goods should 
u t i l iz e  s k i l l s ,  a r t i s t i c  tastes, and fa m il ia r  materials. Also, programs 
should be planned in terms of the to ta l requirement o f a people. Indus­
t r i a l  or ag ricu ltu ra l projects should include plans fo r  health and 
education services. Existing in s t i tu t io n s  such as communal work groups, 
social units such as the extended fam ily, and established lines of 
au thority  should be adopted and u t i l iz e d  to the fu l le s t  possible extent.
I t  is  necessary to understand the structure o f any pa rt icu la r  
society and to grasp the points at which readjustment is required by 
the in troduction o f s c ie n t i f ic  knowledge and techniques.
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The Iranian case was one o f the most complicated cases fo r  the 
American policymaker. Should a person ask i f  there is  a lesson to be 
learned from th is  case? Iran is a dramatic example of the f r u i t s  of 
Cold War in te rven tion is t po lic ies in s tra teg ic  Third World countries.
The royal d ictatorsh ip in Iran has i t s  counterparts throughout Asia, 
A fr ica , and Latin America, in government perceived by important sections 
o f the public as loyal executors of U.S. po licy. Regimes such as those 
of the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco are s im ila r ly  
denied na tiona lis t legitimacy, and they are para lle l in vu ln e ra b i l i ty .
One o f the problems w ith  American policy in Iran was the fac t that 
the U.S. Government always focused on the Shah's regime in formulating 
th e ir  policy in Iran. Instead o f supporting the Iranian people and the 
opposition, the American administrations sided with the Shah. By the 
la te  1970s, i t  was d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the Iranian people to d istinguish 
between America's in tentions and the Shah's goals.
The Iranian case should be a valuable example fo r  future American 
foreign policy throughout the Third World. I f  the American policymakers 
use th e ir  experience in Iran, there might s t i l l  be a hope to keep the 
Philippines on the American side. The American government should become 
involved as soon as possible in negotiations with the opposition to 
Marcos' regime. I t  is  very l ik e ly  that Marcos w i l l  be overthrown ,in the 
near future. Direct negotiation with the opposition might resu lt  in a 
peaceful transformation o f  the power in the Philippines, and a fr ie nd ly  
re la tionship with the future government in tha t country.
I t  is less l ik e ly  that the Reagan Administration w i l l  change i t s  
policy in the Philippines. When a reporter asked Reagan (during his
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presidental debate on October 8 , 1984) why the U.S. now supports the 
Marcos regime and why the Administration does not learn a lesson from 
the Iranian experience, the President's response was, "There is a big 
communist pressure on the Philippines government. We cannot stop 
supporting them; we do not have any other a lte rn a t ive ."
Maybe the nature o f the Philippines' c r is is  is  d if fe re n t from the 
Iranian c r is is ,  but i t  seems to be going through the same rhythm.
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